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Abstract 
 
In May 2019 the U.S. government activated the Title III of the Helms Burton Act. Title III 
grants U.S. nationals whose property was expropriated in Cuba after the 1959 revolution a 
private right of action against those who traffic in their property. The purpose of the thesis is to 
analyze the legal, political, economic and social consequences of the activation and its 
incompatibility with international law. The study therefore examines expropriation rights, state 
immunity from jurisdiction and the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. 
Analytical and applied legal research has been conducted by evaluating primary and 
secondary sources of law such as national legislation, treaties, international jurisprudence and 
legal opinions. Such sources are applied in lawsuits against companies including Meliá, 
Expedia and Booking that use property expropriated from U.S. nationals. The main findings 
reveal that Title III property claims will have jurisdictional problems in national courts because 
expropriation disputes are intergovernmental. The thesis, however, not only demonstrates that 
the Helms Burton Act aggravates Cuba’s economic crisis and undermines international law, but 
also proposes possible approaches for resolving property claims.
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Summary 
 
After the 1959 Cuban revolution, the new socialist Cuban government led by Fidel Castro 
assumed power. Its ideology situated Cuba as an ally of the Soviet Union. Amid the Cold War, 
this caused problems with the United States and after several disputes, Cuba proceeded to 
expropriate properties owned by U.S. nationals and foreigners. Years later, the United States 
introduced the Helms Burton Act wherein Title III granted U.S. citizens the right to sue 
individuals who trafficked in properties expropriated from U.S. nationals in Cuba.  
Trafficking refers to the action of knowingly and intentionally engaging in property-
related activities. The Act gives the term a broad definition by which individuals using 
expropriated property may incur liability. For example, Spanish company Meliá was sued for 
operating hotels in Cuba in a joint venture with Cuban state-owned companies formerly owned 
by Cuban American citizens. The Act was criticized by the international community which 
claimed its illegality for being contrary to international law. 
Their argument is based on the fact that Title III provisions violate laws and cause legal 
effects inconsistent with international law. The latter recognizes the right of states to 
expropriate since it is an act emanating from state sovereignty. This right is subject to conditions 
of public use, non-discrimination and compensation, otherwise that state would incur 
international responsibility for expropriating property of a national of another state. However, 
even if these conditions are not met, the right of a state to expropriate is not impaired. 
As a state act, expropriation disputes must be intergovernmental. The United States, by 
conferring the right to sue on its citizens, transforms a state dispute into a domestic claim against 
individuals using the properties. This raises jurisdictional issues in national courts because for 
determining whether individuals trafficked in the property, it is necessary to assess the legality 
of the expropriation and the nature of the property. Therefore, national courts may decline 
jurisdiction in accordance with international law norms, in particular jurisdictional immunities 
of states and their property. 
National courts could also interpret claims in their ordinary sense. That is, claims for 
trafficking against private individuals and not against the Cuban government. Nevertheless, the 
absence of prior practice in international law regarding the act of trafficking in expropriated 
property complicates the determination of a breach. To prevent a violation of property rights, 
the United States could espouse its citizens’ claims against the Cuban government in 
accordance with the principles of diplomatic protection. 
Despite this, the major criticism against the Act is the extraterritorial application of Title 
III. By allowing claims against individuals trafficking in expropriated property, it also includes 
nationals of third states. This is inconsistent with international law since state jurisdiction, or 
the capacity of a state to exercise its powers, is rooted in territory. International law allows 
exceptions for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction particularly when an action has a 
substantial connection between the matter in dispute and the state’ s sovereign authority. 
In the absence of such a connection, the United States is precluded from exercising its 
laws extraterritorially. In response, the European Union and certain countries have adopted 
blocking statutes prohibiting the enforcement of foreign court judgments in their territories with 
respect to Helms Burton Act disputes. Therefore, not only do the provisions, which are contrary 
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to international law, create jurisdictional problems for claimants in national courts, but also any 
prospective ruling will be difficult to enforce beyond U.S. territory. 
The Helms Burton Act extends the political dispute between Cuba and the United States 
to companies engaging in lawful international trade with Cuba. Companies offering tourism 
services have been most affected. For example, Meliá, Booking, Expedia and Trivago are being 
sued for using property expropriated from Cuban American citizens. The rationale of this is 
that the tourism industry represents the largest source of revenue for Cuba as it is the sector 
where companies mostly invest. Thus, the United States uses Title III to strengthen economic 
and political pressure on Cuba. 
The lawsuits have led several companies to suspend or terminate their business activities 
in Cuba. This seriously affects the Cuban economy which depends on foreign investment. 
Nonetheless, other companies have decided to remain operating in Cuba based on the illegality 
of the Act and the protection of their respective countries. Given the risk of being sued under 
Title III, these companies should adopt protective measures and potential legal defenses. 
Along with the economic problems posed by the Act, the Cuban economic crisis has 
exacerbated with the Covid-19 pandemic. Ideally, the conflict would be resolved through 
peaceful settlement mechanisms. A possibility would be the establishment of a claims tribunal. 
Unfortunately, this is unrealistic due to political unwillingness. Perhaps if the Democratic Party 
wins the November 2020 presidential elections there could be a rapprochement. Still, the 
resolution of property claims is necessary for normalizing their relations and for Cuba to 
achieve stability. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
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U.S. national Any United States citizen or legal entity organized under the laws 
of the United States 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2019, the United States government announced that it will no longer suspend the 
application of Title III of the Helms Burton Act.1 Title III is the section which confers on U.S. 
nationals, whose property was nationalized by the Cuban government after the 1959 revolution, 
a right of action against individuals who profit from that property.2 Thus, it aims at protecting 
property rights of U.S. nationals and strengthening sanctions against the Cuban government by 
preventing third parties from engaging in economic activities in the disputed properties. 
Following the announcement by the U.S. government, its nationals have initiated legal 
proceedings against companies based in Cuba, the United States and third countries, which 
currently operate in their expropriated property. For example, companies such as, inter alia, 
Meliá Hotels International, Expedia, Booking and Trivago, have been sued under Title III based 
on the fact that they operate hotels, resorts and tourist attractions that are nationalized property 
from Cuban American citizens.3  
Title III of the Helms Burton Act produces legal effects which affect norms of 
international law. In particular, transforms disputes between states, derived from a sovereign 
act such as land nationalization, into a private civil claim contended by U.S. nationals against 
others. This includes nationals of third states conducting business activities in Cuba. Thus, it 
attributes liability to private individuals and entities for acts committed by a foreign state. In 
addition, since land nationalization is an act jus imperii of the state, such claims should not be 
enforced in national courts as states are generally immune from jurisdiction. 
The Helms Burton Act is also extraterritorial because it does not consider norms of state 
jurisdiction and regulates acts committed by third parties abroad. Consequently, complaints 
against hotel operators will encounter legal challenges in domestic courts due to Title III’s non-
compliance with international law. For example, in Spain, the Court of First Instance of Palma 
de Mallorca declined jurisdiction on a claim brought against Spanish company Meliá Hotels 
for the use of expropriated property from a U.S. citizen in Cuba.4 
The EU and countries such as Canada, Mexico and Argentina, have been particularly 
reluctant to comply with the Helms Burton Act. Accordingly, they have adopted legislative 
acts, referred to as blocking statutes, for protecting private companies based in their countries 
that engage in international trade with Cuba. In parallel, in 1996 the former European 
Communities requested consultations against the United States at the WTO arguing that the 
Helms Burton Act is inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreement.5 
As I mentioned, the United States seeks to strengthen economic sanctions against Cuba. 
In doing so, it impacts companies from other countries affecting political and economic 
interests. Together with the context in which the nationalizations occurred, the Helms Burton 
 
1 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, available on: https://www.state.gov/cuba-title-
iii-faqs-libertad/. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
2 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, 22 U.S.C § 6021-6091 (1996). 
3 Mata, Hernandez and others v. Meliá Hotels International, Expedia, Trivago, Booking and others, 19-cv-22529-
FAM (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
4 See Juzgado Primera Instancia núm 24 de Palma de Mallorca, de 2 de Septiembre 2019 (procedimiento ordinario 
542/2019) [Court of First Instance No. 24 of Palma de Mallorca, of 2 of September 2019 (ordinary procedure 
542/2019)]. 
5 United States - The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act - Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities, WT/DS81/1, G/L/71, S/L/21 (13 May 1996). 
 
 
 
6 
Act assumes the lengthy political dispute between Cuba and the United States which influences 
international relations. As a consequence, it could cause bilateral disputes against the United 
States with repercussions on international law.  
Such is the case with Spain, which expressed its inconformity with the its 
extraterritoriality and announced that it will protect its companies based upon Spanish and EU 
law.6 Despite countries adopting legislations with the aim of protecting private entities engaging 
in international trade with Cuba, companies, along with their subsidiaries and affiliates, still 
face legal challenges. Now, they must analyze their business interests with their investors for 
deciding on whether to confront the lawsuits for continuing operating in Cuba or cease their 
activities.  
The legal issues arising from Title III are relevant for international and EU law for 
several reasons. As enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the United States is entitled to protect 
the property rights of its nationals.7 However, through the Helms Burton Act the United States 
causes legal effects which are contrary to norms and principles of international law. As a result, 
claims filed under Title III encounter legal challenges in national courts within the European 
Union, as in the Central Santa Lucia L.C. v. Meliá Hotels International S.A. case.8 
Still, European companies can be sued in U.S. courts for the use of the expropriated 
property. If this occurs and the lawsuits succeed, then disputes as to whether U.S. judgements 
should be enforced in Europe are likely to arise. This could be a challenge for the effectiveness 
and applicability of EU law, especially for Council Regulation 2271/96 which protects 
European companies against the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third 
state.9  
It is also an issue for EU Member States. For protecting European companies engaging 
in lawful international trade with Cuba, Member States will have to oppose United States’ 
actions which could imperil their international relations. Nevertheless, jurisprudence on this 
subject is insufficient and therefore is difficult to assess how courts will interpret international 
and EU Law. For example, Meliá’s judgement was not only the first since the activation of Title 
III but also the first rendered by a European court.10 
Regarding the research question, I will essentially examine what are the legal, 
economic, political and social consequences caused by the activation of Title III. However, due 
to the complexity of legal issues, I will also address other research questions. First, I will discuss 
the provisions of Title III and their legal effects. Second, I will review the applicable rules in 
 
6 El País. España rechazará las reclamaciones de EE UU contra empresas con intereses en Cuba [Spain will reject 
US claims against companies with interests in Cuba], available on: 
https://elpais.com/economia/2019/11/06/actualidad/1573073454_157823.html. Last modified November 7, 2019. 
Accessed May 29, 2020. 
7 U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV § 1. 
8 Meliá case, supra note 4. 
9 Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of the Council of the European Union of 22 November 1996 on protecting against 
the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon 
or resulting therefrom, OJ L 309, 11 November 1996, p. 1-6. Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31996R2271. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
10 Antonio Pastor. Herbert Smith Freehills. Spanish Court Decision Following End of Suspension of the US Helms-
Burton Act: Jurisdiction Declined in Claim concerning Assets Nationalized by Cuba, available on: 
https://hsfnotes.com/publicinternationallaw/2019/11/14/spanish-court-decision-following-end-of-suspension-of-
the-us-helms-burton-act-jurisdiction-declined-in-claim-concerning-assets-nationalized-by-cuba/#page=1. 
Accessed May 29, 2020. 
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respect to property rights of nationals and assess whether they comply with international law. 
Third, I will analyze the extraterritoriality of the Act by interpreting the rules of state 
jurisdiction. Finally, I will explain the jurisdictional problems of Title III claims in national 
courts and the impact of these claims on Cuba. 
Besides the legal issues, property claims also entail the political dispute between Cuba 
and the United States. Thus, for discussing Title III legal issues it is necessary to explain their 
dispute. After the 1959 Cuban revolution, the Cuban government abolished private property 
through nationalizations. This was consistent with its Constitution as well as with agrarian 
reforms introduced after the revolution.11  These reforms occurred amid the Cold War which, 
due to favorable geopolitical location and similar ideology, situated Cuba as an ally of the 
former USSR. 
During the Cold War, Cuba received support from the USSR and both agreed on trading 
sugar products and petroleum.12 In 1960, due to the strategic threat posed to the United States, 
the Eisenhower administration cancelled all Cuban sugar imports, which amounted for half of 
Cuban crop, and advised its oil companies to refuse refining petroleum purchased from the 
USSR.13 Accordingly, U.S. companies with oil refineries in Cuba, such as Exxon Mobil Corp, 
denied refining petroleum.14 
In response, Cuba introduced Law 851, or Nationalization Law, which allowed Cuba to 
nationalize private property, including those refineries.15 This resulted in the expropriation of 
all properties owned by U.S. nationals as well as from other countries. Subsequently, the dispute 
between Cuba and the United States aggravated since the nationalizations strongly affected the 
rights and interests of property owners in Cuba. Thus, in 1962 the Kennedy administration 
placed a trade embargo on Cuba on almost all goods except for food and humanitarian 
supplies.16  
The embargo was strengthened by other laws such as the Cuban Democracy Act of 
1992. Also referred to as Torricelli Law, it prohibited foreign-based subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies from trading with Cuba.17 The dispute worsened in 1996 after Cuba downed two 
U.S. aircrafts claiming the violation of its airspace.18 Pressured by domestic politics,  the 
Clinton administration signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 
1996 (Libertad Act), or Helms Burton Act, codifying the dispute of property claims. 
Controversially, Title III of the Helms Burton Act allowed the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law by permitting its nationals to sue third parties. The Act also contains a 
 
11 See Ley Fundamental de Cuba de 1959, Sección Primera, Artículos 96 y 196 [Cuban Fundamental Law of 1959, 
First Section, Articles 96 and 196]; Ley de Reforma Agraria de 1963 [Agrarian Reform Law of 1963].  
12 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Milica Cosic, “Case Studies in Economic 
Sanctions and Terrorism”, PIIE, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Case 60-3 US v. Cuba (1960- : 
Castro) (2011): p. 1. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Reuters. Exxon Mobil sues Cuba for $280 million over expropriated property, available on: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba-lawsuit/exxon-mobil-sues-cuba-for-280-million-over-expropriated-
property-idUSKCN1S91YQ. Last modified May 3, 2019. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
15 CounterPunch. The Cuban Nationalization of US Property in 1960: the Historical and Global Context, available 
on: https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/03/29/the-cuban-nationalization-of-us-property-in-1960-the-historical-
and-global-context/. Last modified March 29, 2019. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
16 PIIE, supra note 12, p. 2. 
17 See Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6001-6010 (1992). 
18 PIIE, supra note 12, p. 8. 
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provision which authorizes the U.S. president to suspend its application. Such suspension was 
implemented by all U.S. administrations until May 2019 when the Trump administration 
decided to cease the suspension of Title III. As a result, there are currently 5,913 claims valued 
at nine billion USD. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the legal effects of Title III for examining 
potential legal challenges to these claims.19 
The dispute between Cuba and the United States is complex and there are many legal 
issues to be resolved. I have chosen the Helms Burton Act because it not only undermines basic 
principles of international law, but also encompasses much of the dispute between the two 
countries now involving private individuals. Being a conflict of more than 60 years, I had to 
delimit the scope of the research which focuses on the application of international public, 
private and European law. 
The research covers claims filed as of June 2019, immediately following the activation 
of Title III by the U.S. government. Among those claims I have primarily focused on those 
concerning tourism companies as they include several European firms and it constitutes Cuba’s 
largest economic sector, facilitating the analysis of the political conflict. I have also referred to 
other lawsuits under the Act such as against Amazon. Yet, I have not discussed them in detail 
as they mainly concern U.S. companies and not third parties. 
Although I mention different legal systems, I focus on Cuban, U.S., European and 
Spanish jurisdictions.  This is due to the fact that hotel operators being sued are based in these 
territories. Still, the rules and principles of international law described are binding on all states. 
The study seeks to define what are the international consequences of the activation of Title III 
of the Act and evidence its illegality. This implies the legal, political, economic and social 
consequences of the Act on states, private individuals and international law. 
The reason for focusing on European firms is that the EU has adopted a blocking statute 
against the Helms Burton Act which renders claims against them problematic. Companies based 
in other countries not adopting such statutes have also been sued. In not discussing such cases 
it would be interesting to evaluate how Title III affects private individuals in countries which 
have not adopted protective laws in future research.  
I do not intend to justify the acts committed by the Cuban government nor to ascertain 
whether they are unethical. Neither do I advocate for the actions of companies on expropriated 
property nor to establish a mechanism of redress for claimants. I simply want to evidence the 
illegality of the Helms Burton Act based on law and explain potential issues for claims by 
identifying the consequences that Title III has on states and individuals with respect to the 
protection of property rights of nationals and the rules of state jurisdiction. 
In regard to the methodology, I followed analytical and applied legal research. This 
means that I have critically evaluated the provisions of Title III of the Helms Burton Act by 
arguing their inconsistency with international law. Specifically, I analyzed Title III’s non-
compliance by addressing norms of individuals property rights; state rights of expropriation; 
third party liability; and state jurisdiction and extraterritoriality. Accordingly, I researched and 
gathered legal norms from these areas of law for applying them to Helms Burton Act lawsuits 
and suggesting potential court judgments. 
 
19 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc. Title III - lawsuits may be filed. Available on: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/5ccae50eeef1a1c18fe7b14d/155680078237
4/TitleIIIOfLibertadActPotentialImpactByTrumpAdministrationInMarch2019.pdf. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
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I followed these methods because Title III claims are relatively novel and there are no 
court rulings yet. Even though I am not able to compare courts’ reasonings, I have used primary 
sources such as Cuban, U.S., EU and Spanish law, UN conventions and international 
jurisprudence to identify the applicable law in these claims and jurisdictional challenges for the 
claimants. Still, it is difficult to assess how the courts will interpret Title III provisions. 
Nevertheless, the sources I mentioned refer to rules of international law that should be applied 
in Helms Burton Act claims. 
The thesis is structured in three sections. The first section clarifies the difference in 
terms used in the Act, particularly between confiscation, expropriation and nationalization. It 
then describes the provisions of Title III of the Helms Burton Act and the legal effects they 
cause. For example, inter alia, transforms a state dispute between Cuba and the United States 
deriving from nationalization into civil claims and disregards Cuba’s right to expropriate and 
immunity. In addition, it explains the conditions under which individuals are liable and the 
compensatory value. 
Following the explanation of the provisions and their consequences, their infringement 
with international law is detailed by identifying applicable norms. Thus, Cuba’s right to 
expropriate; the conditions for conducting such expropriations as public use, non-
discrimination and compensation; and the rules of diplomatic protection and state responsibility 
with regard to property rights are analyzed. It also explains the absence of trafficking in 
expropriated property regulations in international law. 
The second section criticizes the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Applied 
research is conducted on the laws of state jurisdiction and its analogy to the notion of territory. 
It also discusses exceptions that would allow the U.S. to apply its laws extraterritorially such 
as objective and subjective jurisdiction and their relation to U.S. sovereign authority. The 
previously analyzed regulations are subsequently applied in hotel operators’ lawsuits for 
assessing potential jurisdictional limits in national courts. This includes the blocking statutes 
and the lack of international competence when the immovable property is located in Cuba. 
The third section reviews Cuban American international relations and how their 
political dispute reached third jurisdictions and private individuals. It explains how Title III 
complaints have aggravated Cuba’s economic crisis following the decision of certain 
companies to withdraw from Cuba and the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
For companies that decide to continue operating in Cuba, the section also suggests possible 
legal defenses. Finally, it aims at setting a future outlook after the 2020 U.S. presidential 
elections and the prospects for a peaceful U.S.-Cuba resolution. 
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2. TITLE III OF THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY 
(HELMS BURTON) ACT OF 1996 
2.1. Provisions and legal effects 
The Helms Burton Act comprises four titles. Title I strengthen international sanctions against 
Cuba. Title II establishes U.S. assistance policies to a free and independent Cuba. Title III 
provides U.S. nationals with a right of action against individuals profiting from expropriated 
property. Lastly, Title IV prohibits the entry into the U.S. to individuals who expropriated 
property from U.S. nationals or who profit from such property. Nonetheless, I will explain the 
provisions established in Title III and their legal effects. 
To begin with, it is worth mentioning that Title III uses the term confiscated to refer to 
acts of expropriation or nationalization conducted by the Cuban government. Similarly, the 
complaints against Meliá, Expedia, Booking, Trivago and others, also use the term 
confiscated.20 Therefore, it is necessary that these terms are clarified for understanding the legal 
effects that such terminology causes. 
Confiscation is a term used in U.S. laws in all aspects related to the Cuban 
nationalizations. It refers to a form of nationalization but because the property does not comply 
with domestic law and therefore is seized, as a sanctioning measure, without compensation. In 
contrast, nationalization and expropriation refer to when a state acting in its sovereign capacity 
seizes private property based on a special law or a pre-existing law while offering 
compensation.21 
Title III uses the term confiscation because U.S. nationals did not receive compensation 
for their property. However, when this occurred, the Cuban government offered such 
compensation as it was recognized in Article 5 of the Law 851. Under Article 5, Cuba offered 
the United States to pay with government bonds “which would amortize in not less than 30 
years from the date of expropriation and with an interest rate of not less than two percent”. This 
was also consistent with international practice and Cuba’s economic situation.22 
Even though Article 5 established a payment system, U.S. nationals were still not 
compensated. I will explain the reasons why this did not occur in section 2.2. Nevertheless, 
because the Cuban government seized the properties under Law 851 and Article 58 of its 
Constitution as well as the recognition by international law of the right of the state to 
expropriate, I will use the terms nationalization and expropriation for referring to the measures 
adopted by Cuba against U.S. nationals’ properties.23 
 
20 Mata case, supra note 3. 
21 Rolando Anillo-Badia. “Outstanding Claims to Expropriated Property in Cuba”, ASCE, Association for the Study 
of the Cuban Economy (2011): p. 83. See also Mark W. Friedman, Dietmar W. Prager and Ina C. Popova, 
“Expropriation and Nationalisation”, in The Guide to Energy Arbitrations - Second Edition, ed. Doak Bishop et 
al. (London: Global Arbitration Review, 2017). Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. The Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic (19 January 1977, unreported). Available on: https://www.trans-lex.org/261700/_/texaco-
overseas-petroleum-company-v-the-government-of-the-libyan-arab-republic-yca-1979-at-177-et-seq-/#head_0. 
Accessed May 29, 2020. 
22 CubavsBloqueo. La indemnización por nacionalizaciones [The compensation for nationalizations], available 
on: http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu/es/genesis/la-indemnizacion-por-nacionalizaciones. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
23 La Constitución de la República de Cuba, Artículo 5 [The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, Article 5] (10 
April 2019). Available on: http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Nueva%20Constitución%20240%20KB-1.pdf. 
Accessed May 29, 2020. See also La Constitución de la República de Cuba [The Constitution of the Republic of 
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The Act establishes that Cuban nationals who obtained U.S. citizenship and whose 
property was expropriated before March 12, 199624, are allowed to file complaints. Therefore, 
it grants property claims to individuals who were not U.S. nationals at the time of the injury.25 
For example, if in 1995 a Cuban national obtained U.S. citizenship and that individual owned 
property which was expropriated by the Cuban government before March 12, 1996, then that 
individual is entitled to file a claim under Title III. 
However, it is likely that the United States regards the latter as consistent with its 
Constitution. Under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. citizens enjoy a fundamental right to possess 
their own property which cannot be taken for public use, without due process of law and 
compensation.26 This is reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment which not only extends 
property rights to all persons naturalized in the United States but also affords equal protection 
of laws to any person within its jurisdiction.27 For these reasons, the United States justifies 
private judicial remedies to protect the rights of its citizens.28 
Title III also has the legal effect of transforming intergovernmental disputes into 
domestic legal claims. These claims are governed by U.S. law and are by U.S. citizens against 
individuals who may be nationals of third states.29 Yet, property claims must be settled at state 
level by applying international law. This is because international law acknowledges acts of 
nationalization and expropriation as sovereign acts that are not subject to judgment in national 
courts. 
The recognition of expropriation and nationalization measures as sovereign acts is 
endorsed by international courts and arbitral tribunals, particularly by the PCIJ and the arbitral 
tribunal in the Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libya case.30 Both cases demonstrate that 
“nationalization and expropriation are considered sovereign rights, unless there are explicit 
international obligations that have been violated by a state”.31  In their rulings the courts have 
therefore considered these measures as sovereign and recognized the right of states to 
nationalize and expropriate. 
The PCIJ in the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) case ruled on this subject.32 
After the First World War, followed by the Treaty of Versailles (1919), Germany concluded an 
agreement with Poland named the Convention concerning Upper Silesia (Geneva Convention). 
In the agreement, Germany agreed to transfer the control of Upper Silesia to Poland. In return, 
Poland agreed not to forfeit German property belonging to German nationals situated in the 
 
Cuba] (1 July 1940). Available on: https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/6/2525/36.pdf. Accessed 
May 29, 2020. 
24 This is the date in which the Helms Burton Act was signed into law by former President Clinton. 
25 Inter-American Juridical Committee. Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee in Response to 
Resolution AG/DOC.3375/96 of the General Assembly of the Organization, entitled “Freedom of Tarde and 
Investment in the Hemisphere”. Washington D.C. (1996). p. 37. 
26 U.S. Const. amend. V § 1. 
27 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. 
28 Libertad Act, supra note 2, § 6081. 
29 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 25. 
30 Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (12 April 1977, 
unreported). Available on: https://www.trans-lex.org/261400/_/liamco-v-the-government-of-the-libyan-arab-
republic-yca-1981-at-89-et-seq/. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
31 Guiguo Wang, International Investment Law: A Chinese Perspective (London and New York: Routledge, 2015). 
p. 397. 
32 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Judgement (1928), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17. 
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area. A few years later, Poland violated the agreement because it expropriated two German 
companies from German nationals located in Upper Silesia.33   
Germany instituted proceedings against Poland before the PCIJ. The Court was asked 
to rule on whether there was a violation of the agreement by Poland and if such expropriations 
were lawful. In its judgement, the PCIJ decided that Poland has indeed breached the agreement 
and that it must pay compensation for the expropriated property. In the question on whether the 
expropriations were lawful, the PCIJ held that they were unlawful because Poland violated its 
international obligation under the Geneva Convention.  
Interestingly, the PCIJ did not rule on whether the act of expropriation itself was 
unlawful but on whether the circumstances in which Poland seized the property were. The PCIJ 
was cautious in determining the lawfulness of the measure but since there was an international 
obligation which was breached by Poland, the Court found such expropriation to be unlawful. 
Therefore, even though the PCIJ considered Polish expropriations unlawful because it 
disregarded the agreement with Germany it did not question Poland’s right to expropriate.  
In the Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libya arbitration, the tribunal also ruled on this 
matter. In 1955, with the aim of improving its economic conditions, Libya enacted Petroleum 
Law No. 25 where it established a framework for exploration and production of petroleum 
within the country. Law No. 25 provided a concessionary system for the exploitation of 
petroleum products. The Libyan American Oil Co. (Liamco) was among those granted 
concessions.34 
In 1969, Colonel Muammar el Qadhafi seized power and introduced Law No. 1966, 
nationalizing 51 percent of the concession rights. Years later, the Government introduced Law 
No. 1974 which nationalized the remaining concession rights without compensating for the first 
nor the second measure. Pursuant to the Concession Agreement, Liamco initiated arbitral 
proceedings. Liamco claimed that Libyan nationalizations were politically motivated, 
discriminatory and an unlawful breach of contract contrary to principles of Libyan and 
international law.35 
The tribunal observed that concession rights did not constitute property, as long as those 
rights had a monetary value.36 Since monetary values were involved in the property dispute, the 
tribunal decided that Libya breached the Concession Agreement because it disregarded its 
commitments. Nevertheless, the tribunal went further than the PCIJ by recognizing the right of 
a state to nationalize as sovereign because it is considered an expression of its territorial 
sovereignty but subjected such right to non-discrimination and compensation principles.37 
Both cases subordinated the right to expropriate to certain conditions. Still, they assert 
expropriation as an expression of a state’s sovereign capacity. This means that property claims 
arising from Title III should be settled between the United States and Cuba, not by U.S. 
nationals. In the absence of this, Title III would confuse a claim for damages or restitution 
 
33 Law Help BD. Case Note on The Chorzow Factory (Germany v. Poland, 1928), available on: 
https://lawhelpbd.com/international-law/case-note-on-the-chorzow-factory-germany-v-poland-1928/#_ftnref15. 
Last Modified May 23, 2020. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
34 Libyan American Oil Company v. The Libyan Arab Republic (12 April 1977, unreported). p. 2. Available on: 
https://www.biicl.org/files/3939_1977_liamco_v_libya.pdf. Accessed May 29, 2020.  
35 Ibid., p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 4. 
37 Ibid. 
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arising from nationalization with an action in rem and in personam against individuals who 
benefit from the property.38 
Additionally, Title III uses the term traffic to refer to the activities for which an individual is 
liable under the Helms Burton Act.39 These activities virtually encompass any business 
operation in relation to expropriated property, including business done through subsidiaries and 
affiliates.40 Therefore, it provides liability to U.S. companies as well as third parties that are 
currently operating in Cuba. Specifically, the term refers to: 
a[ny] person (…) that knowingly and intentionally: (i) sells, transfers, distributes, 
dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or 
purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise 
acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property, (ii) engages in a commercial 
activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or (iii) causes, directs, 
participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another 
person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (iii)) through 
another person, without the authorization of any United States national who holds a 
claim to the property.41 
The definition implies that companies physically using expropriated property in Cuba are liable 
under Title III. Though, it also includes companies which engage in these activities without 
using expropriated property. For example, in the Mata and Hernandez v. Trivago and others 
case, several defendants, some of which are based in the European Union, were accused not for 
using expropriated property but for providing online booking services for hotels in Cuba.42 As 
a result, Title III has the legal effect of providing liability for trafficking even if individuals do 
not physically use expropriated properties. 
Resultantly, the Helms Burton Act enables U.S. nationals to initiate legal proceedings 
against traffickers, including those from third countries. In turn, the Act allows the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. This means that Title III has the legal effect of regulating 
activities of third parties operating in Cuba by providing liability to those who use properties 
expropriated from U.S. nationals. Nevertheless, as a measure deriving from Cuba’s sovereign 
state capacity, such as nationalization, the dispute should be governmental and not through the 
regulation of acts of aliens.43 
For justifying the extraterritorial application of the Helms Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6081 
of Title III mentions that international law recognizes that the United States can provide for 
rules of law for conducts outside its territory if it has or intended to have an effect in its 
territory.44 While international law recognizes such jurisdictional norm, it is unclear how such 
expropriation measures may have an effect on U.S. territory. In addition, since international 
law acknowledges state’s rights to nationalize as inherent to their sovereignty, individuals using 
 
38 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 25, pp. 37-38. 
39 Libertad Act, supra note 2, § 6023. 
40 Gowling WLG. Cuba Update: Helms Burton Act Title III Activated, available on: 
https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2019/cuba-update-helms-burton-title-iii-activated/. Last 
modified May 8, 2019. Accessed May 29, 2020. 
41 Libertad Act, supra note 39. 
42 Mata case, supra note 3, p. 16. paras. 65-68. 
43 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 25. 
44 Libertad Act, supra note 2, § 6081. 
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those properties are not violating legal norms because their actions are consistent with 
international and Cuban law.45  
By recognizing state’s rights to expropriate, international law ascertains that the 
expropriating state enjoys freedom for using such property. Thus, the expropriating state may 
grant rights to third parties for operating in the expropriated property. Third parties are also 
lawfully engaging in business activities because Cuban law authorizes expropriation within its 
territory.46 This means that their actions are legitimate under Cuba’s national law. Therefore, 
Title III has the legal effect of providing liability for nationals of third states even when the use 
of those properties is lawful within Cuban jurisdiction.47 
In relation to the liability, 22 U.S.C. § 6082 of Title III establishes the value of the 
claims for which private defendants are responsible. Specifically, 22 U.S.C. § 6082 determines 
that a trafficker is liable to a U.S. claimant for the value of the claim, plus interest, reasonable 
attorney’s fees and court costs.48 Though, 22 U.S.C. § 6082 also stipulates that the amount for 
which individuals are liable may vary under three circumstances, but in all of them the greater 
amount has to be applied. 
The first circumstance enumerated in Title III distinguishes between certified and non-
certified claims. Certified claims are from those plaintiffs who were U.S. nationals at the time 
of the expropriation; whereas non-certified claims are from those plaintiffs who were Cuban 
nationals at the time of the expropriation but who later became U.S. nationals.49 Both categories 
must be reviewed by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC). If a claim is certified 
by the FCSC, 22 U.S.C. § 6082 provides that the defendant is liable for the amount established 
by the FCSC under the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA) of 1949 plus interest.50 
The second circumstance allows U.S. courts to determine the amount of a claim under 
a Title III action if the claim has not been certified by the FCSC.51 For assigning value to claims, 
U.S. courts are entitled to appoint a special master, including the FCSC, to determine the value 
of the claim.52 However, any determinations on value by the FCSC do not constitute certified 
claims under Subchapter V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.53 
The third circumstance calculates the amount by the market value of the property 
according to its current value or the value of the property when expropriated plus interest, 
whichever is greater.54 The interest is calculated from the date of expropriation until the date 
on which the action is brought.55 This means that the interest is accumulative. Nonetheless, 
Title III also establishes that if a U.S. national holds a certified claim by the FCSC, a person 
 
45 Cuban Constitution, supra note 23, Article 58. See also José Bell, Delia Luisa López and Tania Caram, 
Documentos de la Revolución Cubana 1960 [Documents from the Cuban Revolution 1960] (La Habana: Instituto 
Cubano del Libro, 2007) [Cuban Book Institute]. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 25, p. 38. 
48 Libertad Act, supra note 2, § 6082. 
49 Gowling WLG, supra note 40. 
50 International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. Subchapter V - Claims Against Cuba and China § 1643-1643m. 
51 Libertad Act, supra note 2, § 6083. 
52 Ibid. 
53 International Claims Settlement Act, supra note 50. 
54 Libertad Act, supra note 48. 
55 Ibid. 
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who traffics in expropriated property would be liable for triple of the overall amount determined 
by 22 U.S.C. § 6082, which is also called increased liability. 56 
These circumstances create three legal effects. First, for determining the amount, Title 
III does not consider the value of the benefit obtained from the expropriated property nor the 
loss caused to the original owner. Thus, it creates liability for a private defendant for the total 
value of the expropriated asset.57 Second, in relation to increased liability, Title III determines 
compensation in a manner that could increase to three times the loss caused by the act of 
expropriation.58 Third, in addition to allowing claims against nationals of third states, Title III 
does not endow them with effective means to contest the claims’ values calculations. 59 
Besides, 22 U.S.C. § 6082 includes the economic reasons for the implementation of the Act. 
The United States holds that that the Cuban government obtains financial benefit from 
expropriated property belonging to U.S. nationals, specifically hard currency, oil and 
investment, undermining the commitment among nations, freedom of commerce and economic 
development.60 It also indicates that it aims at protecting property rights and increasing its 
economic pressure on Cuba. 61 For obtaining such financial benefits Title III explains that the 
Cuban government: 
(…) is offering foreign investors the opportunity to purchase an equity interest in, 
manage, or enter into joint ventures using property and assets some of which were 
confiscated from United States nationals.62 
These practices are followed by most travel and tourism-related companies. For example, 
Cuban state-owned companies Gran Caribe, Cubanacán and Gaviota operate in joint ventures 
with Spanish company Meliá in properties expropriated from U.S. nationals.63 Therefore, 
through Title III the United States reinforces its pressure against Cuba by targeting tourism, the 
industry that accounts for Cuba’s major source of revenue.64 Consequently, the dispute between 
Cuba and the United States affects foreign tourism companies as they have to decide whether 
to discontinue their transactions or confront lawsuits for trafficking. 
 
56 Ibid. 
57 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 47. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Libertad Act, supra note 28. 
61 Exercising economic pressure on a foreign state with the attempt to change its government and institutions is 
contrary to the principle of non-intervention recognized under international law. Article 2.4 of the UN Charter 
refers to this principle by establishing that all Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Consequently, the International Court of Justice in the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) case 
clarified the principle by holding that “the principle of non-intervention prohibits a State to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another State”. This was reiterated 
in 2005 by the International Court of Justice in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) case. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports. 1986 (June 27), p. 108. para. 206. and 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Merits, Judgement, 
I.C.J. Reports. 2005 (December 19), p. 227. para. 164. 
62 Libertad Act, supra note 28. 
63 Mata case, supra note 3, p. 13. para. 61. 
64 Revenue from tourism surpassed that of sugar exports. In 2018, revenue from tourism accounted for 3.3 billion 
USD. See Xinhua. Feature: Cuba seeks to increase quality of its tourism industry by holding in’l fair, available on: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/31/c_138106208.htm. Last modified May 31, 2019. Accessed May 
29, 2020. 
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2.2. Applicable norms and non-compliance with international law 
The Helms Burton Act in 22 U.S.C. § 6023 defines the term United States national as any U.S. 
citizen or legal entity organized under the laws of the United States, commonwealth, territory 
or possession.65 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution defends property 
rights and endows individuals within U.S. jurisdiction to equal protection of laws.66 However, 
Title III allows individuals who were not U.S. nationals at the time of the expropriations to 
submit claims.  
Basically, when the expropriations occurred these individuals were Cuban citizens and 
were not within the United States jurisdiction as defined by 22 U.S.C. § 6023 of the Helms 
Burton Act and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Considering 
norms of international law relative to the protection of property rights, it is a condition that at 
the time of the injury until the settlement of the claim the owner of the property must have been 
a U.S. national without interruption and not have the nationality of the expropriating state.67  
This was discussed in the United Nations Administrative Decision V from the 
differences arising among members of the United States-Germany Mixed Claim Commission. 
The Administrative Decision V declared that there is certainly a “general practice not to espouse 
private claims unless in the point of origin they possess the nationality of the claimant State”.68 
Hence, Title III does not conform international law because the United States does not have the 
right to espouse claims by persons who were not under its jurisdiction at the time of the injury.69 
Still, the United States is entitled to safeguard the rights of whom were U.S. nationals 
at the time of the expropriations for avoiding breach of property rights. The norms of diplomatic 
protection established by the ILC provide that if an individual is unable to obtain effective 
redress in accordance with international law, a state is entitled to espouse the claim through an 
official intergovernmental dispute.70 Considering this principle, the U.S. government could 
espouse the claims of its nationals and agree with Cuba to resolve the claims through a dispute 
settlement mechanism of their choice. 
Due to the nature of the dispute such espousal is improbable. Nevertheless, it has been 
exercised by both countries before in the Walter Fletcher Smith Claim (Cuba v. United States) 
case of 1929.71 In this case, Mr. Smith was an U.S. citizen and Cuban resident. He owned all 
the stock of Marianao Beach Company which in turn possessed properties at Marianao Beach. 
In 1919, he signed a contract with Playa Company in which he sold all the stock except for two 
parcels of land which were under his personal name. The contract of sale specifically excluded 
these two parcels. 
Later that year, the municipality of Marianao granted a concession to Playa Company 
for urbanizing the district around Marianao Beach. This included the properties bought from 
 
65 Libertad Act, supra note 2, § 6023. 
66 U.S. Const., supra note 27. 
67 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 47. 
68 Administrative Decision No. V. (United States of America v. Germany), Arbitral Award, U.N., 1924, (II), 
(October 31), p. 119. 
69 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 47. 
70 Ibid. See also Report of the International Law Commission, GAOR, 61th Session Supplement No. 10, at 16, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/10 (2006). 
71 Reports of International Arbitral Awards. Walter Fletcher Smith Claim (Cuba v. USA), Volume II pp. 913-918 
(1929). 
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Mr. Smith as well as the two parcels of land which were in principle excluded. The municipality 
tried to buy the two remaining parcels but were unable to reach an agreement on the price. 
Shortly after, people who were interested in buying the two parcels threatened Mr. Smith with 
destroying them.  
The Mayor of Marianao instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of 
Marianao for expropriating the parcels. The court gave preliminary possession to the 
municipality and a few hours after the decision the buildings located in the parcels were 
demolished. Mr. Smith appealed the expropriation in a higher Cuban court, but its petition was 
dismissed. In consequence, the U.S. government espoused Mr. Smith’s claim and reached an 
agreement with the Cuban government to submit the dispute to arbitration through diplomatic 
channels. 
Finally, the arbitral tribunal decided in favor of Mr. Smith arguing that the expropriation 
proceedings were not in good faith and for public utility. Again, the lawfulness of the measure 
tantamount to expropriation was not challenged. Therefore, The Walter Fletcher Smith Claim 
not only demonstrates that the United States could espouse certified property claims but that 
the United States also implicitly recognizes expropriation as a sovereign act since the U.S. 
government was compelled to raise the dispute against the Cuban government because Mr. 
Smith could not obtain effective redress in Cuban courts. 
As in the Factory at Chorzów and Liamco cases, the arbitral tribunal in the Walter 
Fletcher Smith Claim also subjected expropriation to certain conditions. This relates to another 
applicable but contested norm in international law. Under such norm, any state that expropriates 
or nationalizes property owned by foreign nationals must respect the following rules: public 
use, non-discrimination and accompanied by fair and adequate compensation.72 
Article 1 (right to property) of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human 
rights (ECHR) refer to these rules. The ECHR establishes that individuals are entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and that no one shall be deprived from them. However, 
it also mentions this shall not impair the right of a state to enforce laws to control the use of 
property in accordance with the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law.73  
These expropriation rules have also been included in UN resolutions. The most significant 
resolutions are 1803 (XVII) of 196274 and 3281 (XXIX) of 197475, both adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. Both are generally cited as customary international law and have adopted 
expropriation rules while recognizing the right of a state to nationalize and expropriate. For 
example, Resolution 1803 asserts that: 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest (…). In such cases the owner shall be paid 
appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In 
any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national 
jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon 
 
72 Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 47. 
73 Protocol 1 Article 1 ECHR. 
74 G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (XVII 1962). 
75 G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3281 (XXIX 1974). 
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agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute 
should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.76 
Resolution 1803 also mentions that in a controversy the national jurisdiction of the 
expropriating state shall be exhausted. It adds that upon agreement by sovereign states, 
settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication. It is 
unclear whether U.S. nationals exhausted local remedies in Cuba. If they did, the Resolution 
evidences that the United States government could espouse the claims of its nationals by 
agreeing with the Cuban government to refer the matter to a dispute settlement mechanism as 
in Walter Fletcher Smith Claim. 
Regarding Resolution 3281, the UN General Assembly mandated the adoption of the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) which embodies principles of customary 
international law.77 Similarly to Resolution 1803, the CERDS includes the rule of 
compensation. Yet, it also denotes the right of a state to nationalize and expropriate 
emphasizing that in the event of a dispute it shall be settled in the courts of the expropriating 
state unless agreed by the states concerned that other means are to be sought. Particularly, 
Article 2 of the Charter expresses that: 
(…) [each state has the right to] nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting 
such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of 
the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all 
States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign 
equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.78 
International jurisprudence has also recognized these rules. For example, the rule of non-
discrimination was noted in the Liamco arbitration where the company claimed that the 
nationalizations effectuated by the Libyan government were discriminatory.79 Similarly, the 
arbitral tribunal in the BP v. Libya case also referred to the non-discrimination principle by 
deciding that nationalization measures which are discriminatory or politically motivated 
unrelated to the internal stability of the state are illegal and invalid.80 
The non-discrimination rule was also examined in U.S. courts amid Cuban 
nationalizations. The most relevant case was Banco Nacional de Cuba (National Bank of Cuba) 
v. Sabbatino.81 The issue in dispute was that due to nationalization measures the Cuban 
government seized sugar products owned by Compañia Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de 
Cuba (C.A.V.), a Cuban company owned by U.S. stockholders. Before it was expropriated, 
another U.S. company called Farr, Withlock & Co. contracted for buying sugar from C.A.V. 
and because it was seized in the midst of the transaction, Farr, Withlock & Co. bought the 
products directly from the Cuban government.  
After receiving the sugar, Farr, Withlock & Co. did not pay the Cuban government but 
a representative of C.A.V. named Sabbatino. In representation of the Cuban government, the 
 
76 G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 74, p. 2, para. 4.  
77 G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 75. 
78 Ibid., p. 4, Article 2(c). 
79 Liamco case, supra note 34, p. 3. 
80 BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (BP v. Libya), Arbitral 
Award, 1973, (October 10), pp. 14-15, para. 56. 
81 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).  
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National Bank of Cuba lodged a complaint in the U.S. District Court of New York which 
decided in favor of the defendant ordering the National Bank of Cuba to pay compensation. 
The court held that the nationalization measure was contrary to standards of international law 
because “the act classifies United States nationals separately from all other nationals and 
provides no reasonable basis for such a classification”.82 
The National Bank of Cuba appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge 
John Marshall Harlan shared the opinion of the U.S. State Department that Cuban measures 
manifestly violated principles of international law and in essence were “discriminatory, 
arbitrary and confiscatory”.83 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court applied the Act of State 
doctrine84, meaning that it upheld the legality of the expropriations because it was an official 
act of Cuba which cannot be adjudicated by U.S. courts.  
The Sabbatino case also examined the rule of compensation. The U.S. District Court of New 
York ruled that if compensation is not paid, the nationalization is unlawful.85 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court overturned the decision and upheld Cuba’s sovereign right to nationalize. It 
would seem, then, that the failure of the expropriating state to comply with these rules does not 
jeopardize the legality of the act unless the action is expressly forbidden by a treaty as in the 
Factory at Chorzów and Liamco cases. This was supported by the former Special Rapporteur 
on State Responsibility Francisco Garcia-Amador, who argued in his fourth report to the ILC 
that: 
According to a generally accepted principle, an expropriation is not necessarily 
“unlawful” even when the action imputable to the State is contrary to international law. 
(…) an expropriation can only be termed “unlawful” in cases where the State is 
expressly forbidden to take such action under a treaty or international convention.86 
As for the rule of public use, it has not been uniformly applied in international jurisprudence. 
For example, it was applied by the arbitral tribunal in the Walter Fletcher Smith Claim by 
holding that “the expropriation proceedings were not, in good faith, for the purpose of public 
utility”.87 In parallel, in the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia and Factory at 
Chorzów cases, the PCIJ made a similar reasoning by affirming that international law allows 
expropriation of property from foreigners as long as it is for public utility.88 
In contrast, other courts and tribunals have had a different interpretation of the rule of public 
use. For example, in James and others v. United Kingdom, a case concerning property 
expropriation under English Land Law, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided 
that it is at discretion of the national authorities to determine what constitutes reasons of public 
interest.89 Similarly, the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal held in the Amoco case that: 
 
82 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). 
83 Opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, available on: https://www.iilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Banco-Nacional-de-Cuba-v.-Sabbatino.pdf. Accessed May 29, 2020.  
84 The Act of State doctrine establishes that measures adopted by other states in relation to their internal affairs 
cannot be challenged in United States courts. This doctrine is related to the principle of state immunity which is 
recognized under international law. 
85 Sabbatino (S.D.N.Y.) case, supra note 82. 
86 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1959), Vol. II, 13, para. 50. 
87 Walter Fletcher Smith Claim award, supra note 71, p. 915. 
88 Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Judgement (1926), 
P.C.I.J. Serie A, No. 7, p. 22.  
89 James and others v. The United Kingdom, no. 8793/79, Commission Report of 11 May 1984, DR 56, p. 43. 
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A precise definition of the “public purpose” for which an expropriation may be lawfully 
decided has neither been agreed upon in international law nor even suggested. It is clear 
that, as a result of the modern acceptance of the right to nationalize, this term is broadly 
interpreted, and that States, in practice, are granted extensive discretion.90 
As demonstrated, the application of the rule of public use varies among international 
jurisprudence. Though, it seems that there is an inclination to leave the criteria at discretion of 
the expropriating state. In relation to the Cuban expropriations, it could be argued that they are 
not for public use because commercial activities are being conducted in the properties by private 
entities. Nevertheless, this is not applicable because Title III lawsuits are not only based on 
commercial transactions between businesses but also on Cuba’s land nationalization, for which 
national courts have no jurisdiction.91 
With regard to the non-discrimination rule, Cuban expropriations are not discriminatory 
as argued by the U.S. District Court of New York in the Sabbatino case. When the 
expropriations occurred Cuba negotiated bilateral settlements claims with other states such as 
Canada, Great Britain, France, Spain and Switzerland.92 Demonstrating that the measures were 
not discriminatory since the expropriated properties belonged to U.S. and Cuban nationals, 
including those who later obtained U.S. citizenship, as well as nationals from other countries.93 
In regard to compensation, U.S. nationals did not receive compensation for their 
property. Arguably, Cuba offered compensation as it was established in Article 5 of Cuban Law 
851 which created a payment system financed from the profits Cuba realized from sugar sales 
in the U.S. market.94 Even so, the system was deemed to be illusory because by 1960 the United 
States cancelled all sugar imports by 95 percent.95 Consequently, the United States rejected 
Cuba’s payment system and due to the embargo U.S. nationals were not able to receive their 
payments. 
The inclusion of a compensation system in Law 851 was an acknowledgment by Cuba 
of its obligations to indemnify U.S. property owners.96 However, payments cannot be enforced 
in national courts because the legality of the nationalizations and the nature of the properties 
must be assessed for proving whether individuals have trafficked in the properties. Hence, 
national courts may dismiss the claims because they cannot judge governmental actions and the 
expropriated assets would be considered state property, both being granted immunity from 
jurisdiction under customary international law. 
As national courts are not competent for adjudicating cases involving foreign states, 
Title III does not comply with international law because domestic courts are not the appropriate 
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forum for resolving disputes between states.97 Additionally, several expropriated properties are 
operated by Cuban state-owned companies, as for example in joint ventures with Meliá. 
However, the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004 
UN Convention) as well as the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States consider state-owned 
companies as organs of the state, which are also immune from jurisdiction in national courts.98 
National courts prohibition on ruling against foreign states was upheld by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in  the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. 
Italy: Greece intervening) case.99 Followed by crimes committed by Germany during World 
War II, Italian courts awarded damages to victims and enforced a Greek judgement in which 
Germany was ordered to pay compensation for crimes committed in Greece.100 As a result, 
German state property located in Italy was forfeited.101 
After the Italian court’s decision, Germany instituted proceedings against Italy before 
ICJ. Germany claimed that Italy violated international law because Italian courts disregarded 
Germany’s jurisdictional immunity. Conversely, Italy claimed that by committing the crimes 
Germany violated jus cogens norms and thus has no immunity. The ICJ asserted that the crimes 
infringed jus cogens norms, but that Germany cannot be deprived from its jurisdictional 
immunity awarded under customary international law.102  
Regarding the forfeited German property, the ICJ applied Article 19 of the 2004 UN 
Convention. Such Article establishes that “no post-measures of constraint (…) against property 
of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State”.103 
Hence, the ICJ ruled that Italy breached its obligation to respect immunity owed to Germany.  
The ICJ’s decision, therefore, reiterates that Title III claims should not be resolved in national 
courts since the Cuban state and its property enjoy immunity from jurisdiction derived from its 
right to nationalize and customary international law. 104 
As I mentioned, the U.S. government could exercise diplomatic protection and espouse claims 
of its nationals for obtaining compensation. Nonetheless, the U.S. Department of State reported 
that prior to such espousal claimants must exhaust local remedies in Cuba. It is unclear whether 
Title III complaints meet this prerequisite but according to U.S. law exhaustion of local 
remedies is a procedural requirement rather than a substantive element of the claim.105 The U.S. 
State Department declared that: 
The requirement for exhaustion of legal remedies is based upon the generally accepted 
rule of international law that international responsibility may not be invoked as regards 
reparation for losses or damages sustained by a foreigner until after exhaustion of the 
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remedies available under local law. This, of course, does not mean that “legal remedies” 
must be exhausted if there are none to exhaust or if the procurement of justice would be 
impossible (…) Each American national must (…) decide whether to “exhaust legal 
remedies” in Cuba, either with a view to obtaining restitution or adequate compensation 
or documentary evidence which could be used to show that justice could not be obtained 
by judicial proceedings. Generally, unsupported assertions to the effect that it would be 
useless to exhaust or attempt to exhaust legal remedies would, of course, have less 
evidentiary value than a court decree or other documentary evidence demonstrating the 
futility of exhausting or attempting to exhaust legal remedies.106 
Although it is virtually impossible due to political unwillingness from both governments, the 
United States could agree with Cuba on establishing an international claims tribunal for 
claimants meeting this procedural requirement. Such tribunal would be similar to those settling 
disputes of state interference in foreign property rights. In accordance to international practice, 
such tribunal would probably recognize Cuba’s right to expropriate. However, it could also find 
Cuba internationally responsible for failing to comply with the rules discussed.  
If such a tribunal holds Cuba responsible, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
adopted by the ILC notes that an injured state may obtain from the responsible state “full 
reparation (…) [in] the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction”.107 Accordingly, the 
tribunal may recognize three methods of redress. Two, restitution and compensation, were set 
forth in the Factory at Chorzów case establishing as reparation a “restitution in kind, or, if that 
is not possible payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would 
bear”.108  
Under restitution, Cuba would be under the obligation to re-establish the situation before 
the act was act was committed.109 This method is inconceivable because third parties are using 
the properties and their rights would be infringed. More feasible is compensation where Cuba 
shall cover financial damages including loss of profits.110 The third is satisfaction which 
consists in appropriate modalities of acknowledgement of the breach.111 Though, this method 
is improbable because there is no political initiative and the United States prioritizes 
compensation since the claims are valued at nine billion USD.112 
Subsequently, Cuba would be under the obligation to restitute the expropriated asset or 
pay compensation for the damage caused.113 Although it would be a convenient settlement, it 
is unrealistic. Both governments have insufficient political will to form an international claims 
tribunal or to refer the dispute to arbitration. Besides, the United States has no interest in solving 
the dispute because it aims at strengthening its economic pressure on Cuba through the Helms 
Burton Act by targeting its major source of revenue.  
Other alternatives for paying compensation to claimants could also be pursued. For 
example, Cuba could use state-issued instruments. These may not be redeemed for cash but can 
be used as collateral for loans to repay property sold by the state; to purchase property offered 
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for sale by the state; or as investment instruments.114 Another possibility is that Cuba offers 
economic incentives to invest in the country. This includes giving credits on taxes and duties 
for all or part of the claim value.115 
For these alternatives, the consent of the U.S. government, however, is required. In 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that individual claimants do not have 
the right to negotiate directly with a foreign state.116 This means that negotiations must be 
between governments, which is unlikely due to political unwillingness.  
Regardless of possible alternatives, Helms Burton Act lawsuits remain being private 
civil claims against individuals. These individuals include companies from third states liable 
not for being involved in the nationalization but for trafficking in expropriated property. For 
example, German company Trivago GmbH is being sued for providing online booking services 
for hotels in Cuba, activity which is not associated to nationalization.117  
With the Helms Burton Act, the United States is modifying the juridical bases for 
liability.118 Instead of attributing responsibility to Cuba for nationalizing, it assigns liability to 
third parties for using expropriated property, which is unregulated in international law. This 
means that international law has not previously recognized the wrongful nature of trafficking 
in expropriated property.119 As there is an absence of prior practice on this subject, the use of 
expropriated property by third parties does not contravene any norm of international law.120 
In consequence, the United States does not have the right to impose liability on third 
parties not involved in a nationalization through the creation of liability not linked to the 
nationalization and unrecognized by international law on this subject.121 Nor it has the right to 
attribute liability to nationals of third states for a claim against Cuba.122 Thus, Title III does not 
conform international law because the United States is not entitled to ascribe responsibility to 
nationals of third states for acts committed by Cuba as an expression of its sovereign 
authority.123 
If U.S. courts decide against private individuals using expropriated properties in Cuba, 
it may itself constitute a measure of expropriation resulting in the international responsibility 
of the United States.124 This is due to the fact that even though the properties are being used by 
third parties, they are still Cuba’s government assets and the United States would not be 
respecting the immunity of Cuba and its property. 
For the latter, two conditions must be met under the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility. First that the act is attributable to the state and second that there is a breach of 
an international obligation.125 Under the first condition, if U.S. courts enforce Title III claims, 
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their actions are attributable to the United States government because the conduct of state 
organs is attributed to the state under international law.126 
Regarding the second condition, Article 12 establishes that a state breaches an 
international obligation when such conduct is not in accordance with the requirements of that 
obligation, regardless of its origin or character.127 In this requirement, the United States would 
be breaching its obligation under customary international law to respect the immunity of Cuba 
and its property. Therefore, the United States would bear international responsibility for 
committing an internationally wrongful act with its conduct of ruling against Cuba and third-
state nationals in its domestic courts. 
Furthermore, I also explained that under 22 U.S.C. § 6082 of Title III a trafficker may 
be subject to treble damages to claimants.128 Nevertheless, the United States does not have the 
right to impose compensation in any amount greater than the effective damages, including 
interest, resulting from Cuba’s measures.129 This is thoroughly covered by international practice 
and jurisprudence which do not recognize treble damages. 
In the Factory at Chorzów case, the PCIJ evaluated how compensation should be awarded. It 
stated that if restitution is not possible, the injured state must receive a payment corresponding 
to the value of the restitution.130 It added that: 
(…) the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered 
by the restitution in kind or payment in place of it—such are the principles which should 
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international 
law.131 
The United States-Iran Claims Tribunal in the Amoco case also referred to this matter. The 
tribunal established that the investor is entitled to compensation equating to the full value of 
the expropriated asset and damnum emergens, or losses suffered upon the date of 
expropriation.132 Consequently, the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility seems to codify 
these customary rules establishing that “compensation shall cover any financially assessable 
damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established”.133 
The practice of the European Court of Human Rights is more instructive. The ECtHR 
approach is to estimate the reasonable amount related to the fair market value of the 
expropriated property. This allows states and the ECtHR more discretion in determining a fair 
amount of compensation by enabling them to consider other circumstances and equitable 
considerations.134 The ECtHR compensation assessment varies depending on the rules involved 
but it does not include treble damages in its jurisprudence.  
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For example, in Pincová and Pinc v. Czech Republic the ECtHR held that the person 
deprived of his property must obtain compensation reasonably related to its value.135 In Vistiņš 
and Perepjolkins v. Latvia, the ECtHR argued that the compensation amount must be calculated 
based on the value of the property at the date on which the ownership was lost.136 The same 
was decided in Moreno Diaz Peña v. Portugal where the court calculated the amount of 
compensation according to the value of the property upon the date of expropriation.137  
Similar to the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, the ECtHR considers that losses 
suffered must be considered for determining the compensation amount. Among the losses, the 
ECtHR includes not only the value of the land of the expropriated property but also of business 
activities taking place on it.138 For instance, in Werra Natursein GmbH & Co Kg v. Germany,  
the court established that the value of the expropriated land and effective loss were due to the 
applicant.139  
More importantly, the ECtHR observes that compensation should have a compensatory 
role as opposed to a punitive or dissuasive one. In Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy, the court dismissed 
the applicant’s petition on assessing the losses by the equivalent of the gross value of the 
buildings erected by the state in expropriated land. The court added that such method leads to 
disparities in the treatment of applicants because is not necessarily related to the land’s original 
potential.140  
The court concluded that such compensation method assigns a punitive role for the 
respondent state rather than a compensatory role for the applicants.141  This decision can also 
be interpreted in Helms Burton Act claims. Since the United States seeks to tighten sanctions 
against Cuba, it may not be as concerned with compensating its citizens as with adding pressure 
on Cuba. However, as the Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy case explains, the United States cannot assign 
a punitive role to compensation. 
This is reflected in 22 U.S.C. § 6082 of Title III, where it appears that the focus is on the 
trafficker rather than the complainant.142 It states that: 
(…) any person that, after the end of the 3-month period beginning on the effective date 
of this title, traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban government on or 
after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim 
to such property (…).143 
Therefore, it could be argued that the United States focused less on establishing a cause of 
action than on establishing liability to those who traffic in expropriated property. This is also 
demonstrated by the power attributed to the U.S. President to suspend the application of Title 
III. Thus, the possibility of bringing a cause of action is suspended and, through continued 
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liability, discourages third parties from engaging in commercial activities on expropriated 
properties.144 
Furthermore, international practice has not provided for treble damages. This is 
regulated by U.S. law but as I have argued Title III claims must be governed by international 
law rather than by U.S. law. Thus, in the absence of established international practice regarding 
treble damages, the United States does not have the right to impose compensation in a way that 
damages are tripled. Consequently, the practice determined by jurisprudence in this regard 
should be followed. 
In addition, the Helms Burton Act does not recognize third-country nationals’ due 
process rights.145 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution expresses that “no 
person shall (...) be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law (...)”.146 
The principle that the term person includes both U.S. citizens and foreigners is recognized in 
U.S. jurisprudence. However, U.S. courts have disputed whether this is the case or whether 
only aliens with permanent residence are entitled to such protection.147 
For example, in the Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding case, the U.S. Court for the Eastern 
District of New York held that only foreigners with permanent residence in the United States 
and who remain physically there, are persons under the Fifth Amendment.148 Therefore, Kwong 
Hai Chew, a foreigner with permanent residence in the United States but who worked as a sailor 
on a U.S. ship, did not enjoy that right. Following the decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
adjudicated the case and held that all people enjoy the right to due process of the law.149 
The U.S. Supreme Court made particular reference to this issue in the Zadvydas v. Davis 
case. The Supreme Court established that the right to due process applies to all persons, 
including foreigners, regardless of their status.150 For this reason, the United States cannot 
deprive a foreigner of this right. Even more, if it directly affects their property in Cuba. Such 
due process right granted to foreigners includes the possibility of contesting the value of the 
claim and the way in which it is determined by the FCSC, which is not allowed under Title 
III.151 
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3. EXTRATERRITORIALITY, LIMITS OF JURISDICTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETENCE IN NATIONAL COURTS 
3.1. Extraterritorial application and state jurisdiction 
As I have explained, the Helms Burton Act is an extraterritorial U.S. legislation. This has been 
the main reason why the European Union, Canada, Mexico and Argentina have criticized the 
Act and alleged its violation of international law. Therefore, I will describe the rules applicable 
to state jurisdiction, both territorial and extraterritorial, and the non-conformity of the Helms 
Burton Act with international law in this matter. 
Jurisdiction is defined as the capacity of a state under international law to prescribe and 
enforce laws. This concept, which derives from state sovereignty, is an essential component of 
its statehood. Classically, this right has been limited to the territory of the state. Now, this 
concept of jurisdiction has varied its application and there are exceptions. These exceptions 
allow extraterritorial jurisdiction in certain circumstances.152 However, they do not include acts 
performed abroad by aliens based on trafficking in confiscated properties. 
There are certain ways by which a state can exercise its jurisdiction. Those used by the 
United States through the Helms Burton Act are legislative and judicial jurisdiction. Legislative 
jurisdiction refers to the power of the state to apply its laws in the activities and interests of 
people either by legislations, executive acts, administrative regulations or determined by courts. 
While judicial jurisdiction refers to subjecting people or things to the processes of the courts 
and tribunals, whether through civil or criminal proceedings.153  
Accordingly, it can be inferred that the Helms Burton Act would result in the exercise 
of legislative and judicial jurisdiction over foreign nationals. This is because the United States 
would be applying its laws to actions committed abroad by aliens for conducting commercial 
activities related to expropriated property. In addition, through judicial jurisdiction the United 
States subjects these third-state nationals to its domestic courts through civil proceedings. All 
this based on a broad notion termed traffic.154 
In principle, states are free to exercise their jurisdiction. This was established by the 
PCIJ in the Lotus case.155 In this case, two ships belonging to Turkey and France collided on 
the high seas and eight Turks aboard the ship died. In 1926, Turkey initiated a trial against the 
French ship’s commander detained after the collision. France protested claiming that the 
Turkish authorities had no jurisdiction. Thus, the PCIJ had to decide whether there is a norm in 
international law that prohibits Turkey from exercising its jurisdiction over a conduct that 
occurred outside its territory. 
In the absence of such a norm, in 1926 the PCIJ allowed Turkey to exercise its jurisdiction, 
both legislative and judicial. The PCIJ noted that as long as there is no rule prohibiting it, states 
have complete discretion to establish their jurisdiction over an act even when it occurs outside 
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their territory. Thus, Turkey was able to exercise legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the 
French commander. However, the PCIJ added: 
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that 
-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary- it may not exercise its power 
in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a 
permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention. It does not, 
however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in 
its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place 
abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such 
a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to 
States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general 
prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases.156  
Therefore, the freedom of states to exercise their jurisdiction must respect the limits imposed 
by international law. Otherwise, that state will incur international responsibility.157 Before, the 
aim of the law of jurisdiction was to defend the sovereignty of states based on negative 
obligations or prohibitions. This means that states cannot assert their jurisdiction over matters 
that are the domain of other states as for instance acts taking place extraterritorially. Doing this 
would mean violating the principles of non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states.158 
In order to defend the state sovereignty against extraterritorial jurisdiction of other 
states, the PCIJ in the Lotus case imposed a significant restriction on the exercise of state 
jurisdiction. This is that, based on the aforementioned principles, a state cannot exercise its 
power in any form in the territory of another state except when allowed by a norm of 
international law. Hence, the basic premise under international law for establishing legislative 
and judicial jurisdiction was rooted in the principle of territoriality.159 
The concept of jurisdiction in relation to territory has been used in the context of Cuban 
nationalizations. It was endorsed by Restatements of the Law from the American Institute of 
Law (AIL) and also by United States jurisprudence.160 Section 469 (1) of the Second 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Second Restatement) of 1952 
declares that: 
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal 
principles, courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the validity 
of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or from sitting in 
judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its 
own territory and applicable there.161 
Such section was consistent with the U.S. Supreme court decision in the Underhill v. Hernandez 
case.162 This case was about the illegal arrest of Underhill, a U.S. citizen in Venezuela, by 
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General Hernandez who after a revolution in 1892 established a new government. After 
allowing Underhill to return to the United States, he instituted a legal action for claiming 
damages for his illegal detention. However, a New York court refused having jurisdiction on 
the grounds that Hernandez acted in his official capacity and his actions represented those of 
the Venezuelan government. 
Underhill appealed the judgement to the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite this, the Supreme 
Court upheld the decision of the New York court by reasoning that each sovereign state must 
respect the independence of other sovereign states and therefore prohibited U.S. courts to decide 
on foreign state’s acts fully executed within their territories. This principle was termed the Act 
of State Doctrine, which was also applied in 1964 in the Sabbatino case.163  
This demonstrates that both international law and U.S. common law recognize 
jurisdiction as primarily territorial and that U.S. courts must refrain from adjudicating cases 
that involve acts committed by other states abroad. This is particularly important because the 
expropriations occurred abroad, were clearly acts of the state and the immovable property is 
located in Cuba. Thus, the United States cannot exercise its jurisdiction extraterritorially 
because it would violate not only its common law but also basic principles of international law. 
Under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) there are exceptions that 
allow the United States to exercise its jurisdiction extraterritorially. Nonetheless, these 
exceptions do not include acts performed abroad by aliens entirely outside of the territory of 
the United States. I will describe these exceptions when explaining the limits of jurisdiction in 
domestic courts of Title III claims.164 For now, it is important to note that these exceptions also 
establish that there must be a relationship with the territory of the United States.165 
Furthermore, before examining claims under the Helms Burton Act U.S. courts will first 
have to assess the legality of the expropriations. This is another problem for U.S. claimants 
since expropriation is a sovereign act and the properties, as they belong to the state, enjoy 
immunity from jurisdiction under international law. This would compel U.S. nationals to turn 
to their government so it could espouse their claims and seek recourse through diplomatic 
channels such as in Walter Fletcher Smith Claim.166 
According to what I have mentioned, jurisdiction is in principle territorial. Pursuant to 
this principle, acts committed on the territory of a state fall directly within its jurisdiction.167 
However, international law also allows states, in the exercise of their territorial jurisdiction, to 
regulate acts whose constituent elements may have occurred only in part in their territory. For 
example, under objective territoriality a state can regulate an act initiated abroad but 
consummated within its territory. While under subjective territoriality a state can regulate acts 
initiated within its territory and consummated abroad.168 
This has been applied in European jurisprudence. In November 2008, the European 
Parliament and the Council introduced Directive 2008/101/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC 
so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
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within the Community.169 The Directive, which uses objective and subjective territorial 
jurisdiction, was upheld by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Air Transport 
Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change case.170 
In this case, U.S. airline operators filed a claim in the ECJ seeking to avoid inclusion in the 
EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) as established by Directive 2008/101/EC. U.S. airlines 
claimed that the their inclusion in the ETS was invalid and not justified by international law or 
a specific agreement between the EU and the United States.171 The court rejected the claim that 
the ETS could not apply to flights mostly occurring outside of EU territory by arguing that: 
In laying down a criterion for Directive 2008/101 to be applicable to operators of air- 
craft registered in a Member State or in a third State that is founded on the fact that 
those aircraft perform a flight which departs from or arrives at an aerodrome situated in 
the territory of one of the Member States, Directive 2008/101, inasmuch as it ex- tends 
application of the scheme laid down by Directive 2003/87 to aviation, does not infringe 
the principle of territoriality or the sovereignty which the third States from or to which 
such flights are performed have over the airspace above their territory, since those 
aircraft are physically in the territory of one of the Member States of the European 
Union and are thus subject on that basis to the unlimited jurisdiction of the European 
Union.172 
The European Court of Justice was able to determine that the EU had jurisdiction because the 
activities of the airlines initiated abroad and consummated in the territory of member states and 
vice versa. Still, the ECJ established that the activities must be related to European territory. In 
contrast, the Cuban expropriations have no relation to the territory of the United States. The 
expropriations were conducted by the Cuban government within its territory and the properties 
are located in Cuba. Therefore, the United States cannot exercise its jurisdiction because the 
activities do not relate to its territory. 
This type of jurisdiction recognized by the ECJ became known as the effects doctrine. 
Under this doctrine, a state may have legislative jurisdiction over a conduct occurring outside 
its territory but that causes an effect within. The doctrine was also included in Section 18 of the 
Second Restatement which recognizes it as an applicable norm of international law in respect 
of the exercise of jurisdiction by states.173 However, the Third Restatement of the Law of 
Foreign Relations of the United States (Third Restatement) of 1987 expanded the basis for 
exercising legislative jurisdiction.174 
The Third Restatement established that the United States has jurisdiction over activities 
of its nationals outside as well as within its territory and over certain conducts outside its 
territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against essential sovereign interests.175 In 
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addition, the Third Restatement also broadened certain conditions, originally established by the 
Second Restatement, that must be met in order for the United States to exercise its jurisdiction 
by these means. 
Under these conditions, the United States state may justify the application of the laws 
of its territory only to the extent that an act occurring outside its territory causes a direct, 
substantial and foreseeable effect within its territory and the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
reasonable.176 For the latter, it is implied that a state cannot exercise its jurisdiction over persons 
or activities having connection with other states. Thus, the Third Restatement mentions the 
criteria for considering the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable by enumerating the 
limitations on legislative jurisdiction.177 
Regarding Cuban nationalizations, it is clear that both the expropriations and the 
activities conducted by third-state nationals on the properties do not cause a direct, substantial 
and foreseeable effect within the territory of the United States. For example, if a ship belonging 
to a Spanish company disembarks at a dock in Cuba that was expropriated property of a U.S. 
citizen, it evidently has no effect on the territory of the United States, nor it affects its sovereign 
interests.  
As for the reasonableness condition, the limitations for exercising jurisdiction are 
determined by factors such as nationality178 and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by 
another state.179 In accordance with these limitations, third parties operating in expropriated 
property do not have a nationality relation with the United States and if their actions are 
regulated, it will surely create a conflict with their respective states who may have a legitimate 
interest in regulating their activities. 
Evidently, none of the conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, the United States does not 
have the right to exercise jurisdiction over acts of trafficking committed abroad by third-country 
nationals. Especially when neither the alien nor the conduct in question has a connection to the 
territory and where there is no apparent connection between the acts and the protection of the 
sovereign interests of the United States. As a result, the Helms Burton Act does not comply 
with international law in any of these respects.180  
As I have explained, jurisdiction has been primarily regarded as territorial. Its objective 
was to defend the sovereignty of the states based on negative obligations because otherwise 
principles such as non-intervention and sovereign equality of the states would be violated. 
Nonetheless, in recent times a more positive dimension of the law of jurisdiction has been 
developed which reflects the evolution of international law towards a law of cooperation.181  
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The latter implies that instead of states being allowed to exercise jurisdiction they 
sometimes have an obligation to do so, especially with respect to values owed to the 
international community. For example, the concept of jurisdiction in international criminal law 
and international human rights law has acquired an obligatory dimension in which states must, 
in certain circumstances, exercise their jurisdiction extraterritorially.182 Despite this, none of 
these allow establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction for trafficking in expropriated properties. 
Thus, international law currently allows extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases of 
territories subject to occupation, activities of state agents operating outside national borders or 
when a state does not fully control its territory. While it is true that these situations primarily 
address human rights issues, they also provide evidence of the progress of the law of state 
jurisdiction in this regard which does not include jurisdiction over third-country nationals for 
acts committed abroad.183 
Therefore, considering the applicable norms of international law regarding state 
jurisdiction, a state can exceptionally exercise its jurisdiction on a different basis than 
territoriality. Nevertheless, there must be a substantial or significant connection between the 
matter in dispute and the sovereign authority of the state. As for example in the case of the 
exercise of jurisdiction over acts performed abroad by its nationals and to safeguard essential 
sovereign interests; which certainly differs from what Title III regulates.184 
3.2. Limits of jurisdiction and international competence in national 
courts  
Following the activation of Title III by the Trump administration, U.S. nationals have filed 
lawsuits against third-country nationals. The most prominent claims are those filed against hotel 
operators in Spanish and U.S. courts. According to the claims, companies such as Meliá, 
Booking, Expedia and Trivago have illegally enriched by providing tourism services in Cuba 
which are performed on properties expropriated from U.S. nationals and which now belong to 
the Cuban state.  
Other companies have also been sued under Title III. For example, Visa and MasterCard 
are being sued for processing payments for properties in Cuba; Amazon for selling on its 
website goods produced on expropriated property; American Airlines and LATAM Airlines, 
the latter being a Chilean company, for operating in Cuba’s international airport which was 
expropriated from a Cuban family; and, the Canadian company Teck Resources for conducting 
mineral extraction on property owned by a Cuban-U.S. citizen.185 
Because of such lawsuits, there are companies that have decided to temporarily suspend 
or even cease their activities in Cuba. Others have opted to continue operating and will 
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eventually be, if not already, sued. It is therefore important to analyze the jurisdictional 
problems that these lawsuits will encounter in civil courts, taking into account the applicable 
norms of international law discussed, the blocking statutes adopted by third countries and 
national legislations. 
The first case filed in a European court after the activation of Title III was in Spain. In 
June 2019, U.S. company Central Santa Lucia L.C. initiated proceedings against the Spanish 
hotel chain Meliá in the Court of First Instance of Palma de Mallorca. The suit was brought by 
a Cuban-U.S. family who were heirs of the former owner. They claimed their right to receive 
fruits of possession in bad faith and to benefit from the confiscated property, as established in 
Article 455 of the Spanish Civil Code.186 
Meliá asked the court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction and international 
competence on the grounds that the expropriation of the land had an essential role in the claim; 
it was an expression of Cuba’s sovereign authority; and therefore, the state enjoys immunity 
from jurisdiction. In contrast, Central Santa Lucia argued that national legislation governing 
the judiciary and international treaties concluded by Spain entitle the court to exercise judicial 
functions.187 
Furthermore, Central Santa Lucia added that the claim is against Meliá, a private legal 
person incorporated in Spain, in connection with commercial transactions of a private nature 
conducted with Gaviota S.A., a Cuban state company with independent legal personality, and 
therefore immunity from jurisdiction is not applicable. Consequently, the court proceeded to 
examine the two legal issues raised: jurisdiction and international competence.188 
The court understood that the claim was based primarily on the illegality of Cuba’s 
nationalization of the land owned by Central Santa Lucia. Thus, the court deemed necessary to 
evaluate the legality of the nationalization to determine if Meliá had illicitly benefited from the 
agreement signed with the Cuban state. The court considered that the nationalization is a 
sovereign act and despite the fact that neither Cuba nor Gaviota S.A. were part of the 
proceedings, it applied Spanish Law 16/2015 on privileges and immunities of foreign states, 
which is consistent with the 2004 UN Convention on Immunities ratified by Spain.189 
Central Santa Lucia argued that such law is not applicable because according to Article 
9 there is no immunity when there is a commercial transaction.190 However, the court dismissed 
the allegation, holding that the claim is not based on commercial transactions but on the 
nationalization performed by Cuba. As to the nature of the property, the court considered that 
it is state property which enjoys immunity from jurisdiction. Therefore, it applied Article 21 of 
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Spanish Organic Law 6/1985 of the Judiciary, which prevents the adjudication of claims with 
respect to subjects or property that enjoy immunity from jurisdiction and execution.191 
As to international competence, the Court referred to Article 22 of the Judiciary which 
excludes Spanish courts from jurisdiction when the immovable property is in a foreign state.192 
It also referred to the EU Regulation 1215/2012 which provides jurisdiction exclusively to the 
courts of the member states where the property is located in proceedings defining rights in rem 
in immovable property.193 Thus, the court held that the determination of the claimant’s right 
was the basis for obtaining the profits earned by Meliá after operating the hotels.194 
As a result, the court upheld Meliá’s contentions and declined jurisdiction and 
international competence. This was also consistent with the Council Regulation 2271/96 which 
protects natural and legal persons in the EU against the extraterritorial effects of legislation 
adopted by third countries.195 However, Central Santa Lucia filed an appeal which was upheld 
in April 2020 by the Provincial Audience of Palma de Mallorca. In the appeal, the claimant 
argued that his right to effective judicial protection recognized in Article 24 of the Spanish 
Constitution was violated.196 
Accordingly, the claimant stated that he has not directed the lawsuit against the Cuban 
state but against a Spanish company with domicile in Spain. The Provincial Audience 
concluded that although Central Santa Lucia does not intend to do so, it cannot be ignored that 
the claim demands as a fundamental question the legality of the Cuban decision of 
nationalization of property according to international law. Furthermore, as established, the 
Spanish jurisdictional bodies are prohibited from making such an assessment.197 
Nonetheless, the Provincial Court considered that the lawsuit should be processed 
according to its literal configuration since no claim is directed against a foreign state or its 
assets. The Provincial Court argued that Spanish courts have jurisdiction in the case of a 
procedure against a company domiciled in Spain in the exercise of a personal action for 
compensation. Hence, it understood that these consequences should not be confused with the 
fact that the entire procedure cannot be managed and recognized the right of the plaintiffs to 
obtain a judgment even if it is dismissed.198 
The Court of First Instance made a valid assessment considering the applicable rules of 
international law discussed. Surprisingly, the Provincial Court considered that the Court of First 
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Instance confused the claim. Since the case will be referred back to the same court, the latter 
will probably decide to have jurisdiction and will have to hear the proceedings because under 
Spanish law, Central Santa Lucia must obtain a judgment. In spite of this, it is plausible that in 
its judgement the court will dismiss the claim because Spanish courts are not competent to 
assess whether or not the nationalizations conducted by the Cuban state since 1959 are lawful. 
For Meliá the issue is that the procedure itself violates Council Regulation 2271/96. 
Such Regulation establishes that any judgement of a court located outside the EU giving effect 
to the Helms Burton Act shall not be recognized or enforceable and bans proceedings against a 
European national for commercial activities undertaken in a third jurisdiction such as Cuba.199 
This means that under European law the Court of First Instance of Mallorca should not 
adjudicate the case, otherwise doubts will be raised as to the applicability of the Council’s 
Regulation. 
Moreover, Meliá was included in a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida against Trivago, Booking, Expedia and Cuban state-owned 
companies.200 In this lawsuit, Cuban-U.S. families allege, as I have briefly explained, that these 
entities provide online booking services for hotels in Cuba, including those operated by Meliá. 
The plaintiffs explain that Meliá operates in joint ventures with Cuban state-owned companies. 
Therefore, the families assert that they have all trafficked in properties that have been 
expropriated after the Cuban revolution.201 
However, in January 2020, the plaintiffs excluded Meliá, Trivago and Cuban state-
owned companies from the lawsuit, leaving only Expedia and Booking as defendants.202 
Although litigation continues, it is likely that the plaintiffs decided excluding them after 
observing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Mallorca, the difficulty from U.S. courts 
to exercise personal jurisdiction and the impossibility of enforcing the judgment in the EU due 
to regulation 2271/96.  
If the Florida court were to apply the same criteria as the Spanish courts, it is probable 
that the case against Expedia and Booking would be dismissed. Under this rationale, the Florida 
court would have to evaluate the legality of the nationalization and the nature of the property 
to analyze whether the defendants have benefited from trafficking in the properties. In this 
regard, the Florida court would find that it has no jurisdiction since the Cuban state and its 
property enjoy immunity under U.S. law. 
Under this assumption, the court would have to consider whether it can exercise 
jurisdiction over Cuba in accordance with the immunity exceptions set forth in the FSIA.203 
With respect to expropriation, these exceptions stipulate that a foreign state’s immunity does 
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not apply in cases “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in 
issue”.204 Thus, three elements are established: rights in property, taken and in violation of 
international law.205 
The first element relates to physical or intangible property. The other two elements refer 
to nationalization or expropriation of property by a foreign state without payment of the 
compensation required by international law.206 Accordingly, the Florida court, after conducting 
the respective analysis, may adjudicate the case on the basis that these requirements are not met 
by Cuba. Nevertheless, in addition to these elements, there is another requirement which is that 
there must be a commercial nexus.207 
According to this commercial nexus, the court would not have jurisdiction. This is 
because according to such requirement the seized property must be present in the United States 
in connection with a commercial activity or, if the property is operated by an agency or 
instrumentality of the foreign state, such agency or instrumentality must be engaged in a 
commercial activity in the United States.208 Therefore, since both the immovable property and 
the Cuban state companies operating the properties are in Cuba, the court would not have 
jurisdiction. 
In addition, U.S. courts consider that expropriations or nationalizations of private property by 
foreign governments are presumptively considered non-commercial. For example, in the Garb 
v. Poland case, the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit held that “expropriation is decidedly 
sovereign -rather than a commercial- activity”.209 Similarly, the same court in Hunt v. Mobil 
Oil Corp. stated that: 
(…) expropriations of the property of an alien within the boundaries of the sovereign 
state are traditionally considered to be public acts of the sovereign removed from 
judicial scrutiny.210  
By this approach, the Florida court would have no jurisdiction because it would be necessary 
to evaluate the legality of the nationalization and the nature of the property to ascertain whether 
Booking and Expedia have benefited. However, even though the proceedings are in progress, 
the court may consider such an assessment unnecessary and understand the complaint against 
Booking and Expedia in its ordinary meaning: a civil remedy against U.S. based companies for 
trafficking in expropriated property in contravention of the Helms Burton Act and not against 
the Cuban state. 
As this is a private civil claim the Florida court would have subject matter jurisdiction. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) U.S. courts have jurisdiction over 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.211 Hence, 
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since this action arises under the Helms Burton Act the court does have jurisdiction. Besides, 
the Helms Burton Act establishes that U.S. courts are obliged to adjudicate and make a 
determination on the merits, prohibiting the application of the Act of State doctrine.212 
Similarly, the court would have personal jurisdiction over Expedia and Booking. According to 
Florida Statute § 48.193 natural or legal persons, regardless of whether they are residents of 
Florida, submit to the jurisdiction of Florida courts when they cause injury by certain acts.213 
These include operating or conducting business activities or having an office or agency in 
Florida as well as causing injury to persons within Florida arising out of an act or omission by 
the defendant outside of Florida.214 The latter may occur in two forms, specifically: 
a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or 
b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the 
defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of 
commerce, trade, or use.215 
Accordingly, as the plaintiffs explain, Expedia and Booking maintain contacts, regularly 
transact business and derive benefits from their presence in Florida.216 Therefore, according to 
Florida Statute § 48.193 (6) they have both caused injury within Florida by committing acts 
outside while engaging in solicitation within Florida.217 In addition, according to the U.S. 
judicial code the venue is proper because it provides that if there is no district in which an action 
can be brought, any judicial district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction of 
the court may adjudicate the case.218 
The lawsuit also meets the requirement of Title III that the amount in controversy must 
exceed 50,000 USD.219 Thus, the Florida court would have jurisdiction over all aspects of the 
dispute, both subject matter jurisdiction and over the defendants. If so, Booking and Expedia 
will likely be charged with liability for trafficking in the expropriated property. This means that 
they also face treble damages and the amount could increase by three times its value. 
Nonetheless, the Helms Burton Act seems to have deviated from its original purpose. 
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4. POLITICAL DISPUTE AND POTENTIAL LEGAL DEFENSES 
In its effort to exert more political and economic pressure on Cuba, the Helms Burton Act was 
initially intended for preventing foreign companies from investing in Cuba by creating liability 
for using expropriated property. Nevertheless, the lawsuits have instead primarily resulted in 
U.S. companies being sued under Title III. It is estimated that U.S. companies represent 
approximately 50 percent of all defendants including, inter alia, Amazon, American Airlines, 
Expedia, TripAdvisor, Visa and MasterCard.220 
More disappointingly for the Trump administration is that there are only two Cuban 
companies, Union Cuba-Petroleo and Cimex Corporation, which continue as defendants 
representing only four percent of all sued companies. About 11 percent of all defendants are 
based in the EU, most of which are Spanish companies.221 However, it could be expected that 
cases against them will not proceed due to Council Regulation 2271/96. Other countries such 
as Canada, Mexico and Argentina have also been affected but have adopted legislations against 
the Helms Burton Act. 
For example, Canada enacted the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA) which, 
similar to Council Regulation 2271/96, authorizes the Canadian government to block foreign 
laws applied extraterritorially against Canadian companies.222 The FEMA specifically includes 
the Helms Burton Act among the legislations to be blocked, allowing the free flow of trade 
between Canada and Cuba. Similarly, Mexico and Argentina have also enacted legislation that 
protects their companies from the application of the Helms Burton Act.223 
Due to these protective legislations, judgments against Canadian, Latin American and 
European companies will probably not be enforceable. This means that only a limited amount 
of trafficking claims will be effective, and these will be against U.S. companies. Nonetheless, 
third-state companies may have assets in the United States and could still face potential 
lawsuits. This, together with the risk of being sanctioned, has caused foreign companies to 
decide whether or not to continue operating in Cuba. 
For example, after the activation of Title III only 15 companies from the Canary Islands 
(Spain) remain conducting business in Cuba compared to the 56 that had previously operated.224 
In addition, the executives of the companies that opt for remaining in Cuba also confront Title 
IV of the Helms Burton Act, which prohibits their entry into the United States. As a result, 
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Meliá executives have been notified by the U.S. Department of State that they prohibited from 
entering the United States.225 
Although countries have adopted legislations to protect their companies and claims 
against them may not be effective due to jurisdictional issues, this has still not prevented 
companies from leaving Cuba. Other aspects such as the risk of future sanctions and additional 
lawsuits, including litigation costs, may have contributed to this. While this clearly affects the 
commercial interests of third parties, it also negatively impacts the already weakened Cuban 
economy. 
Trade between the 56 Canary Islands companies and Cuba was estimated at 40 million 
euros. After the activation of Title III, and with 15 of those operating in Cuba, trade has 
considerably decreased to approximately 5.5 million. This means that seven out of 10 
companies, or 73 percent, have stopped exporting to Cuba and the amount of trade has collapsed 
by 86 percent.226 Financial institutions have also lessened their exposure and other companies 
have chosen to freeze or abandon their interests, worsening Cuba’s economy.227 
Undoubtedly, Helms Burton Act lawsuits have been corrosive for Cuba. Accompanying 
the impact of these lawsuits are other restrictions adopted by the Trump administration that 
have also pressured Cuba.228 Among them are the restrictions on travel, business and financial 
transactions, remittances and expansive sanctions imposed since 2017.229 Along with this, 
Cuba’s economy faces severe repercussions from the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Not only tourism has been gravely affected. During the pandemic, Cuba has sent 
medical professionals to other countries such as Italy, Andorra and Venezuela and has been 
unable to secure payments as financial institutions avoid transactions with Cuba due to the 
sanctions.230 In addition, the unemployment caused by the pandemic has impeded Cubans 
residing in Florida from sending remittances to Cuba, which also impacts Cuba’s revenues.231 
Amidst the lawsuits, another problem for Cuba is its relationship with Venezuela. This 
relationship is based on economic, political and social cooperation. However, the punitive 
measures against Venezuela adopted by the Trump administration affect this relationship and 
increase the economic pressure on Cuba. This contributed to an energy crisis in Cuba because 
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Venezuelan companies, the main suppliers of oil to Cuba, have been sanctioned by the United 
States.232 
All this has led to Cuba defaulting on its three billion USD debt to the Paris Club of 
Creditors Nations. Cuba has been gravely impacted by Covid-19 lockdown measures and its 
two most valuable sources of revenue, tourism and remittances, have been reduced. Therefore, 
Cuba has notified its creditors that it will not be able to pay and has requested a delay until 
2022.233 However, its ability to pay will depend on the consequences of the pandemic and on 
whether foreign companies in Cuba continue to operate regardless of Title III. 
In parallel, Cuba’s situation could worsen if the United States decides to return Cuba to 
the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. As the U.S. State Department has announced, Cuba 
would return to the list after failing to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under 22 
U.S.C. § 2781 of the Arms Export Control Act.234 This could have devastating effects for Cuba, 
the United States and third countries as it would affect their economic and political relations. 
As a result, companies operating in Cuba would not only be subject to pressure from the Helms 
Burton Act, but also to increased scrutiny of their transactions.235 
However, all of these measures, including the activation of Title III, could support 
President Trump’s re-election in the November 2020 elections. Florida, a state where many 
Cuban Americans live, is considered a pivotal swing state for winning the presidential elections. 
Except for 1992, Florida has voted with the winner in every presidential election since 1964. 
Yet, elections in Florida have traditionally been narrow. For example, Obama and Trump won 
the state’s votes by only one percent in 2012 and 2016 respectively.236 
That narrow margin has been obtained by winning the vote of senior voters who 
represent a majority of the percentage of Florida’s voting population. In 2016, President Trump 
won by nine percent among voters over 65. Nevertheless, this could be difficult to repeat due 
to the Covid-19 pandemic. Florida residents perceive that the Trump administration’s 
mishandling of the crisis has led to a collapse of public health and the economy, resulting in 
polls indicating Trump’s disadvantage to Democratic candidate Joe Biden.237 
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Moreover, Florida has one of the highest rates of unemployment due to the pandemic.238 
Among them are many Cuban Americans, and this could also hinder President Trump’s re-
election. Hence, the activation of Title III along with the other measures adopted against Cuba 
could be useful to secure the vote of Cuban Americans and compensate for the loss of voters 
from other segments of the population. This means that more punitive measures against Cuba 
can be expected until the 2020 U.S. presidential election, especially if the dispute of the 
nationalized properties is not settled. 
The conflict between the United States and Cuba also poses a challenge for the EU. 
Council Regulation 2271/96 requires European-based companies to obtain authorization from 
the European Commission (EC) before they can file a response to any claim under the Helms 
Burton Act.239 In April 2020, the Spanish company Iberostar Hotels applied for authorization 
from the EC to respond to a Title III lawsuit and requested the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida for a brief stay of proceedings based on the principle of 
international comity.240 
If it had not done so, Iberostar would be subject to a penalty from the Spanish 
government pursuant to Spanish Law 27/1998 on Sanctions Applicable to Infringements of the 
Rules established in Council Regulation 2271/96.241 There is however no specific deadline 
under the European legislation for the EC to respond. Thus, the EC is confronted with a 
potential international relations issue where if it decides against Iberostar and the U.S. court 
rules against the company, it would result in liability and the company’s assets in the U.S. 
would be in jeopardy.242 
Unfortunately, a rapprochement between the Trump administration and the Cuban 
government is virtually impossible. President Trump’s policy toward Cuba has been repressive, 
and so it is unlikely that he will change his rhetoric. This policy of pressure will continue if 
Trump is re-elected, which means that property claims will not have a prompt resolution. By 
contrast, if Democratic candidate Joe Biden is elected president and decides to follow the 
Obama administration’s approach to Cuba, it would facilitate the settlement of property claims. 
The U.S. government retains broad discretion in negotiating FCSC-certified claims, and 
it is likely that certified claimants will favor an expeditious resolution. There are currently 8,821 
claims of which 5,913 have been certified by the FCSC and are valued at approximately nine 
billion USD. However, 30 certified claimants account for 56 percent of the total value of 
certified claims which would create an efficient pathway towards a settlement. In addition, two 
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claims from Office Depot and Marriott account for 24 percent of the total value of certified 
claims, further facilitating an intergovernmental settlement.243 
The objective of the negotiation should be finding a resolution and concluding the 
dispute. Therefore, considering Cuba’s economic problems other opportunities to reach a 
settlement can also be included. For example, along with compensation formats the Cuban 
government could provide transferable securities to certified claimants such as property tax 
credits or the sale of development rights to third parties, United States-based or non-United 
States-based.244 
The normalization of economic and political relations between Cuba and the United 
States would be beneficial to both, as well as to Cuban citizens, claim holders and third parties 
investing in Cuba. For this to occur there must be a resolution of the certified claims. However, 
the current policy of the Trump administration against Cuba indicates that this is not feasible. 
Meanwhile, sued companies should consider other factors and potential defenses under Title 
III. 
Among those defenses, defendants may argue that plaintiffs have failed to assert a claim. 
Title III provides that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally 
trafficked in property that was nationalized by the Cuban government. Thus, defendants can 
contest whether they knowingly and intentionally trafficked in such property or whether their 
actions constitute trafficking.245 
Defendants can also challenge the title to the expropriated property. For claims not 
certified by the FCSC, plaintiffs need to prove that they had title to the property being trafficked. 
This would be challenging to prove since the nationalizations occurred over 60 years ago. 
However, contesting the title to the property will be difficult for certified claims as certain 
expropriations have recently occurred.246 
Title III also mentions certain activities that are exempt from claims. These include 
transactions and uses of property for lawful travel to Cuba to the extent that such transactions 
and uses are necessary for such travel.247 This exception is particularly important for companies 
in the tourism industry as they may argue that their activities are necessary for tourists who are 
lawfully traveling to Cuba. Therefore, they may rely on this exception as a potential defense 
against claims under the Helms Burton Act.248 
Furthermore, the defendants could hold that the claims infringe principles of 
justiciability and constitutionality. This is because the proceedings would violate the Act of 
State doctrine and rights of equal protection and due process of the U.S. constitution. 
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Notwithstanding this possibility, it would be challenging because Title III prohibits the 
application of the Act of State doctrine.249 
There is also the possibility that Title III could be suspended again, especially if the 
Democrats win the November 2020 elections. Nevertheless, the Helms Burton Act provides 
that actions filed before such a renewed suspension will not be affected or suspended. 
Moreover, if the U.S. government announces the reinstatement of the suspension, there could 
be a surge of claims before claimants lose their right of recourse.250 
Still, several companies continue to operate in Cuba.  The result is that they are exposed 
to claims under Title III because of their activities or affiliations with entities trading with Cuba. 
Consequently, companies should analyze their business transactions and adopt measures to 
limit their exposure under Title III. Among these measures, companies should first gather 
information. This will enable companies to assess whether their actions or those of their 
affiliates constitute trafficking.251 
For future transactions involving Cuba, companies should conduct due diligence 
procedures which could assist in the creation of the knowingly and intentionally defense against 
trafficking claims. This would include developing policy and procedure manuals for their 
operations in Cuba and documents indicating their compliance with government regulations. 
Additionally, contracts involving Title III risks should include indemnification and warranty 
clauses and, if possible, companies could consider limiting or terminating their activities that 
create Title III exposure.252 
Exposed companies should also monitor legal developments and set countermeasures. 
This will enable them to establish contingency plans including how to cease their business 
activities in Cuba and what remedies may be available under the blocking statutes or investment 
treaties. Nonetheless, the act of trafficking involves many activities which means that, in the 
absence of established legal practice, there is substantial uncertainty as to how the provisions 
of Title III will be interpreted.253 
Despite all these possibilities, companies will confront a complicated litigation.  
Property claims are merely a part of the political dispute between Cuba and the United States 
which affect third parties. Cuba particularly faces a potential crisis that could worsen if more 
companies are sued under Title III. Certainly, the most appropriate resolution is an 
intergovernmental negotiation. However, this will depend on their political will to resolve 
property claims which is necessary for Cuba’s stability.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Helms Burton Act is a controversial law. The United States seeks to support its citizens in 
resolving their property claims by providing a right of action against individuals who benefit 
from their property. Yet it codifies the dispute with the purpose of strengthening the embargo 
against Cuba. Moreover, the Helms Burton Act extends the conflict between Cuba and the 
United States to companies legitimately investing in Cuba which are being sued for trafficking 
under Title III. 
The provisions of Title III cause legal effects that are contrary to international law. By 
allowing private civil claims the United States disregards that nationalization is a sovereign act 
thus transforming an intergovernmental claim into a domestic legal claim. International law 
recognizes the right of states to nationalize or expropriate so national courts are not allowed to 
entertain such claims under principles of jurisdiction and state immunity. 
In U.S. law this is referred to as the Act of State doctrine, similar to state immunity 
under customary international law. Similarly, Spanish law and other national legal systems also 
grant immunity to the state and its property. However, Title III states that U.S. courts may not 
rely on such a principle to preclude a determination on the merits. This will result in a discussion 
on its justiciability and constitutionality since to determine whether individuals have trafficked 
it is necessary to examine the legality of the nationalization by the Cuban government, over 
which domestic courts have no jurisdiction. 
A claims tribunal could be established for addressing the claims. Such tribunal would 
also be competent to evaluate the conditions of the expropriations: public purpose, non-
discrimination and compensation. Unfortunately, this depends on the political will of both Cuba 
and the United States and is therefore virtually impossible. Besides, the Act includes a broad 
definition of trafficking and, in the absence of an established legal practice, creates uncertainty 
about how the courts will interpret such actions. 
Despite such uncertainty, companies are in principle operating lawfully in Cuba. In 
international law there is an absence of prior practice in this regard in which trafficking in 
expropriated property is unregulated. This means that individuals using such property do not 
violate any norm of international law, and the use is consistent with Cuban law. Therefore, 
further research on judicial interpretation would be useful to establish what activities would 
create liability for companies. 
Several companies have been sued under Title III, with U.S. and European companies 
being the most affected. They also face treble damages, which triples the amount awarded to 
the plaintiffs without allowing the defendants to contest the manner in which the damages were 
calculated. However, claims against them should not proceed as the Helms Burton Act does not 
consider applicable norms of international law and is therefore contrary to it. 
As for the terms, the Act misuses confiscation to refer to acts of nationalization since 
the Cuban state seized the properties in its sovereign capacity and not as a punitive measure. 
Additionally, the Act confers the right to claim on persons who were not U.S. citizens at the 
time of the nationalizations despite the fact that international law establishes that nationality 
must be continuous from the time of the injury until the settlement of the claim. Still, the United 
States could espouse the claims of those who were its citizens at the time of the nationalizations, 
or certified claimants, and seek to negotiate with Cuba. 
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The Helms Burton Act is also contrary to international law because it is an 
extraterritorial legislation. Classically, state jurisdiction, or the ability of a state to exercise its 
powers, has been rooted in territory which means that acts committed on the territory of a state 
fall directly within its jurisdiction. Some exceptions to exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially 
have been established in modern international law, notably in international human rights law 
and international criminal law, which are not applicable herein. 
According to these exceptions a state may justify the application of its laws 
extraterritorially for regulating acts that may have occurred only in part in its territory. This is 
referred to as objective and subjective territoriality. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the basic 
premise is that there must be a substantial connection between the matter in dispute and the 
sovereign authority of the state. Therefore, since there is no connection between the 
nationalizations nor the activities of third parties with the U.S. sovereign authority, the United 
States does not have the right to exercise its jurisdiction extraterritorially. 
The Helms Burton Act not only raises legal issues for companies but its incompatibility 
with international law also causes problems for claimants. For example, in the Meliá case, the 
first since the activation of Title III, the Court of First Instance of Mallorca declined jurisdiction 
because it found that it was necessary to evaluate the legality of the nationalization to determine 
whether Meliá had trafficked in expropriated property. Along with this, the court also referred 
to EU law and considered that it had no international competence as the immovable property is 
located in Cuba. 
The decision was appealed, and the Provincial Audience of Mallorca upheld it 
establishing that its literal interpretation should be heeded, which is a claim of trafficking. It 
would therefore be interesting to monitor the case for reviewing the court’s analysis as it could 
serve as guidance for future lawsuits. Other problems for claimants are blocking statutes such 
as the adopted by the EU. This will further hinder the enforcement of U.S. courts’ judgments 
on European territory. 
Paradoxically, the companies that are mainly sued are United States companies. Thus, 
U.S.-based Expedia and the U.S. subsidiaries of Netherlands-based Booking have been sued in 
U.S. courts for trafficking under Title III. To date these proceedings are still in progress. 
However, it would be interesting to follow the findings in order to compare the courts’ 
interpretations. Furthermore, these claims entail the political dispute between Cuba and the 
United States. 
Cuban tourism industry, the main source of revenue for the government, is the most 
affected. U.S. economic and political pressure on Cuba has extended to companies that must 
decide whether to continue operating in Cuba. In addition, international sanctions and the 
Covid-19 crisis have aggravated Cuba’s economy by not being able to receive remittances from 
Cubans abroad and by not receiving tourists.  
A peaceful settlement between Cuba and the United States would be the ideal solution. 
This would be in the interest of all parties concerned. Yet, political unwillingness by both 
governments hampers such a negotiation. Perhaps a rapprochement will be possible if the 
Democratic Party wins the 2020 elections. Meanwhile, companies at risk of being sued should 
adopt protective measures and prepare potential legal defenses. Even so, property claims must 
be resolved for Cuba’s stability and the normalization of governmental relations. 
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